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ABSTRACT
The standard approach to the study of poverty assumes 
the existence of an ideal variable that captures the extent 
of deprivation. In our first chapter, we postulate that 
poverty is involved with many dimensions . We use a latent 
variable framework to predict the extent of an individual's 
hardship as a function \j/i=axii+bx2 i + ..., where the x's are 
indicators of i's income status, yi, and the latter variable 
is not observed.
In chapter 2, the problem of allocating benefits for 
poverty relief is considered in a situation of uncertainty 
about who the poor are. The decision to grant a benefit of 
fixed size is analyzed in the context of a social 
objective of minimizing poverty, subject to the social 
costs incurred by expenditure on poverty alleviation 
programmes. Chapters 1 and 2 contain empirical applications 
based on the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
We then construct a theoretical model for the purpose 
of studying the relationship between poverty and credit 
market imperfections. These imperfections originate from 
information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders. We 
assess to what extent the above type of information 
asymmetry can be a cause of poverty. We identify cases where 
the presence of information asymmetries has a neutral 
effect, and other situations where it can cause reductions 
in the level of poverty.
We then review the issues pertaining to the topic of 
intergenerational earnings mobility. We define a criterion 
for the justice assessment of intergenerational mobility 
processes, based on the comparison of the earnings 
distributions of children originating from privileged groups 
and those from disadvantaged backgrounds. We apply our 
concept to intergenerational data from the PSID.
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1CHAPTER 0
Introduction and Summary
In this thesis we examine several topics in the 
economics of poverty and intergenerational mobility. Our 
first chapter deals with the problem of identifying the poor 
using multiple indicators of living standards. In our second 
chapter we examine the problem of state allocation of 
benefits when the needs of families are not directly 
observed by the decision maker. In the third chapter of the 
thesis we examine the extent to which credit market 
imperfections may influence the level of poverty in an 
economy with a dual sector structure. Our first two chapters 
deal with methodological questions, while the third follows 
a theoretical orientation, and provides a model of the 
determinants of income. Finally, in chapter 4 we propose a 
criterion for the justice assessment of intergenerational 
mobility processes.
Below we present in more detail the aims and contents 
of the various chapters, and how they all relate to one 
another. Three of our chapters contain empirical sections. 
They are based on the University of Michigan's Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics. In section 0.2 of this 
introductory chapter we describe our data. Then, in section 
0.3, we discuss the data requirements for the study of 
intergenerational mobility, and we assess how close our 
data come to meeting these prerequisites. Though our data 
present several important shortcomings, we conclude that 
they offer some improvements over previous data sets, and 
thus that they may provide useful information regarding the 
topics we are dealing with in the thesis.
20.1 Summary of the thesis
We now summarize the four core chapters of the thesis 
and discuss how they relate to one another.
Identifying the poor
The standard approach to the study of poverty assumes 
the existence of an ideal variable that captures the extent 
of deprivation. The selected variable is often taken as 
income or consumption. The main problem with selecting one 
indicator at the expense of the other, is the well 
documented fact that alternative indicators may offer 
conflicting conclusions about who the poor are. In our 
first chapter, we discuss how several indicators of welfare 
can simultaneously be used in identifying the poor. We use a 
latent variable framework to predict the extent of an 
individual's hardship, as a function \j/i=axii+bx2 i + ..., 
where the x's are observed indicators of i's income status, 
and the latter variable is not observed. The chapter 
contains an empirical application based on a sub-sample of 
the PSID, described in section 0.2 below.
Allocation of benefits under uncertainty
In chapter 2, we pursue the question of chapter 1 
further. Given that it is not possible to exactly assess the 
needs of families, how should the state/decision-maker 
select families to be granted assistance? The decision to 
grant a benefit of fixed size is analyzed in the context of 
a social objective of minimizing poverty, subject to the 
social costs incurred by expenditure on poverty alleviation 
programmes. The chapter contains several empirical 
applications. Their purpose is to illustrate how changes 
in the key parameters of the decision problem, namely the 
poverty line, the size of the benefit, and the shadow cost 
of poverty relief policies, all influence the composition 
of the families which qualify for state support.
3Poverty and the economics of information
In chapter 3 we construct a theoretical model for the 
purpose of studying the relationship between poverty and 
credit market imperfections. We consider an economy where 
individuals have to invest in their human capital in order 
to earn high wages. They may use the credit market in order 
to finance their training. The credit market is imperfect 
because the probability of default of borrowers is non- 
uniform, and unobservable to lenders. The recurring theme 
between this chapter and the previous two, is the 
relationship between poverty and imperfect information. The 
set-up however is somewhat different: in the first two
chapters imperfect information occurs in a relation between 
agents and a government, whereas in chapter 3 imperfect 
knowledge arises in an exchange between private individuals 
(lenders and borrowers in the credit market). Also, we are 
no longer examining how to identify the poor, or how to 
allocate benefits in the light of imperfect information, but 
rather how imperfect information in the allocation of credit 
enters in the determination of income(1) . The aim of the 
chapter is to assess the extent to which the above type of 
information asymmetry can be a cause of poverty. We identify 
cases where the presence of credit market imperfections has 
a neutral effect, and other situations where it can cause 
reductions in the level of poverty.
A justice criterion pertaining to intergenerational 
mobility processes
One important conclusion that emerges from the model of 
chapter 3, is the importance of family background in the 
determination of income. Given that initial circumstances of 
individuals vary, how should we then judge the distribution 
of income at a point in time?
If 10% of the population today are poor, would it be 
irrelevant if these individuals all originated from low
Imperfect information is an increasingly expanding area of microeconomics. 
The text of Hirschleifer and Riley (1992) offers a recent survey of the 
literature. Imperfect information also plays an important role in other 
fields. See for instance Laffont (1989) for public economics, Tirole (1988) 
for industrial organization, and Weiss (1991) for labour economics.
4income families, or would it be a preferred state of affairs 
if they had purely random socio-economic backgrounds? In 
chapter 4 we attempt to answer the above question, where we 
place our focus on the normative assessment of 
intergenerational mobility processes. Looking at the joint 
distribution of incomes of parents and children, we ask the 
following question: what constitutes a just state of
affairs? We define an intergenerational mobility process as 
being unjust, if the income distribution of one group of 
children dominates the corresponding distribution for any 
other group of children, in terms of aggregate welfare. We 
apply our criterion to intergenerational data from the PSID, 
and find supporting evidence in favour of the injustice 
scenario.
0.2 Data
The empirical applications contained in the thesis draw 
evidence from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, (PSID). 
The PSID is a U.S. nationally representative longitudinal 
survey of 5000 families, which has been running annually 
since 1968. The University of Michigan's Institute for 
Social Research provides annual documentation on the exact 
form of the questionnaire, definitions of variables, and 
the composition of the sample. The panel is particularly 
useful for the study of intergenerational mobility because 
the children of the original sample families interviewed in 
1968 become automatically eligible respondents when they set 
up, or become members of, other family units. The survey 
thus allows one to gather information on the earnings of 
parents and children at similar stages of the life cycle.
The PSID is perhaps one of the most frequently analyzed 
data sets on incomes. This fact on its own makes it an 
attractive choice for empirical research. It often allows 
one to compare results with previous studies, and to get a 
feel for the plausibility of one's initial findings. The 
option of contrasting one's findings with those of related 
studies, is a substantial advantage for a graduate student 
with relatively little experience in empirical work.
5The PSID being a specially conducted survey, generally 
offers wider information on family incomes and socio­
economic backgrounds than data sets derived from 
administrative records (a typical source of which are tax 
declarations) . Another factor which makes the PSID a
valuable source of information resides in the fact that it
is a prospective study. That is, it starts with the base 
sample, and updates the information on families at regular 
time intervals. This has meant that the survey centre has 
been able to answer the needs of researchers by collecting 
information on questions which have gained interest in
recent years.
But not all is bright and clear. Use of the PSID calls 
for caution, especially with respect to the following three 
aspects: (i)its representativeness of the U.S. population,
(ii) the non-response problem and, (iii) the attrition bias 
characteristic of long span longitudinal data sets. The 
sample selection and non-response problems are discussed 
below. The attrition question will be discussed in the next 
section where we assess the adequacy of the PSID for the 
study of intergenerational mobility.
In order to assess the representativeness of the PSID, 
one has to look into the history of the survey. In the years 
19 66-7, the Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) interviewed 
30000 U.S. families laying particular emphasis on income, 
employment, and information on socio-economic status. The 
base sample of the PSID included 60% of its families newly 
selected from a national sample, while the remaining 40% 
were drawn from the SEO. The representativeness of the PSID 
is often questioned since the SEO fraction of the data over­
sampled low income families living in urban areas(2) .
Because non-response to income surveys follows a non- 
random pattern, it is another source of sample selection 
bias. In a related U.S. study, Taubman and Wales (1974) find 
evidence that individuals with above average IQ and 
education are more likely to participate in surveys than
The selected SEO families were chosen on the condition that their 
incomes did not exceed twice the US official poverty line.
6those with relatively low IQ and education levels. The first 
round of the PSID had a response rate of 7 6 %. However, this 
figure cannot be taken at face value, since 40% of the 
sample was extracted from the SEO, which at the time, had 
been running for two years. Thus, Atkinson, Bourguignon, and 
Morrisson (1992) pp. 49-50 write:
" In order to calculate the non-response, one has to take account of 
(i) non-response to the SEO in 1966 or 1967, (ii) refusal by SEO 
respondents to be given their name and address, and some losses in 
transmission of this information, (iii) non-response to the 1968 
survey. Only the last of these is taken into account in the figure of 
76% quoted above."
When examined over time, the non-response problem becomes 
that of sample attrition. We will return to this point in 
the next section of the chapter.
Our sample was extracted from the merged family- 
individual tape, of wave XX (1968-1987) of the PSID. The 
prime reason why we opted for a panel as opposed to a cross- 
section based data set, resided in our interest in 
examining questions pertaining to the topic of 
intergenerational mobility. Our first exploration of the 
PSID therefore consisted in constructing a data set for 
individuals participating in the labour force in 1986, whose 
fathers were present in the initial wave of the panel, and 
accordingly, who reported labour income for 1967. We called 
this sub-sample the fathers and sons data.
The initial sample comprised 20487 records and was 
reduced to 945 observations. Figure 0.1 details the steps 
involved with the selection procedure.
Our pairs of fathers and sons were selected in two main 
rounds. In the first stage we retained observations where 
the family was male headed, and where information was 
recorded on at least one dependent child.
7Wave XX of the PSID: 20487 records
Record kept if male, head or son, and- 
if the family has at least one child.
T
3083 records
Record kept if household head is the 
father and the child (children) is 
(are) son(s).
▼
1458 (father,son) pairs
( Record kept if son's wage is recorded for 1986
968 (father,son) pairs
( Record kept if father's earnings for 1967 are reported.
945 (father,son) pairs
FIGURE 0.1 : Selection of the fathers and sons sample
From the selected families, the individual record was 
retained if the person was male. We were left with 3083 
individual records. In the second round, we scanned these 
records in order to link fathers and sons. This stage was 
necessary since at several occasions, the household head 
was an older brother or a grandfather. We then deleted pairs 
if either the father was not working in 1967, or the son 
was out of the labour force in 1986, or if for either of 
them, information was missing for the earnings variable. 
As is shown in figure 0.1, it is mainly missing wages for 
sons as opposed to fathers which caused the final sample to 
shrink from 1458 to 945 pairs. Earnings data in the PSID are 
only recorded for family heads and wives. We therefore do 
not possess information on the earnings of sons who are 
still living in their parents home, regardless of their 
labour force participation status. We were left with a total
8of 945 pairs of fathers and sons. We had 609 distinct 
fathers, so that each father was given a sample weight 
equal to the number of sons he had.
There may be grounds for questioning the choice of 
focusing one's attention on fathers and sons exclusively. 
The debate on nature versus nurture cannot be separated from 
questions of inheritance of economic status. Following a 
nurture line, we may argue that genetic factors are 
irrelevant to studies of intergenerational mobility. 
Excluding a child who was raised by his mother's partner 
that does not happen to be the child's father would be a 
questionable decision. Within the nature stance, one could 
also raise objections to focusing our attention to fathers 
and sons exclusively. As the family structure has undergone 
many changes during the post-war era, it is no longer a rule 
that the mother stays home to raise the children, while the 
father is in full time work. In fact, reasoning along the 
lines of the economics of the family approach, we would 
conclude that the parent who has the higher earnings 
capacity would work in the market, while the other would 
specialize in housework. There may thus be good reasons to 
also include in our analysis mothers in full-time work, not 
just fathers only.
We used the fathers and sons sample throughout the 
thesis. The legitimacy of our choice cannot adequately be 
assessed prior to specifying the exact use, and aims of our 
empirical analyses. It is precisely for this reason that we 
devote the next section of the chapter to the assessment of 
the usefulness of the fathers and sons sample in the study 
of intergenerational mobility. Nonetheless we also use the 
sample in a different context, in chapters 1 and 2. There, 
we examine the identification and allocation of benefits to 
the poor, in the light of imperfect information. Since then 
we do not require information on the incomes of fathers, we 
carry out our applications only on the cross-section of 
sons. In chapters 1 and 2 we are illustrating empirical 
methods as opposed to testing hypotheses regarding 
population variables. In this sense, questions of population
9representativeness may appear of secondary importance when 
compared to the quality with which data are recorded, and 
the range of information available on the socio-economic 
condition of families.
0.3 Adequacy for the study of intergenerational
mobility
In order to obtain an accurate picture of the degree 
of intergenerational mobility, it is generally perceived as 
important that:(1 ) evidence on the earnings of parents and 
children is gathered at similar stages of the life cycle, 
(2 ) that the sample is truly representative of the 
population we are studying, and (3) transitory variations 
and measurement errors in earnings are low. While the second 
and third points may follow from common sense, the first of 
these pre-requisites is less easy to justify.
Intergenerational samples can be derived from cross- 
section based data sources, as well as longitudinal, or 
panel, data sets. In the first of these sources, 
contemporaneous data on incomes are used, where parents are 
observed at a mature stage , and children at an early stage, 
of the life-cycle. Corresponding to the two stages of the 
life-cycle, denote parents incomes by xi and X2 , and 
children's incomes by yi and y2 . Cross-section samples, 
which we denote as Si, contain observations of the type 
(X2 ,yi). Longitudinal data sets contain observations such 
that the incomes of parents and children are ideally 
recorded twenty years or more apart. From longitudinal 
data, three other types of samples can be derived: S2
containing observations of the type (xi,yi), S3 based on 
data of the type (X2 ,y2 ) / and finally S4 , a mixture of S2 and 
S3 data.
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XI
X2,
Y2
S4
FIGURE 0.2: Types of intergenerational data
S 2 and S3 have the distinct feature of containing 
observations recorded at an identical stage of the life­
cycle, whereas in S4 , the two types (xi,yi) and (X2 ,y2 ) are 
present.
In practice, the choice between these four categories 
of samples is to a large extent arbitrary. As Jenkins (1987) 
explains:
"For each family sampled there is usually one observation for a parent 
and one for a child, rather than complete lifetime profiles. And 
because there are only these 'snapshots' observations rather than 
complete 'movies', observed status differences may not be indicative 
of 'true' intergenerational mobility."
The type of sample to be chosen to a large extent depends on 
what the researcher is interested in quantifying, and also 
on the assumptions made regarding the income-generating 
process underlying the data.
Focussing on the estimation of the regression 
coefficient between the incomes of fathers and sons, Jenkins 
has undertaken some simulations in order to compare the four 
types of samples. He concludes his study stating that:
"There is tentative evidence however that between-generation age 
differences are a greater source of bias than within-generation ones."
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As with regards to S2 /S3 , and S4 :
"In any case, intuition is not a good guide to avoiding bias: same
stage-of-the-life-cycle estimates are not necessarily better than
contemporaneous ones, and purging earnings data of variation from 
within-generation age differences does not necessarily make estimates 
less biased."
We have therefore opted for an S4 type of sample. By 
construction, S4 contains S2 and S3 as sub-sets, taking 45 
years of age as the boundary between the early and mature
stages, the ratio of S2 to S3 observations is approximately
2:1 in our sample. From table 0.1, we see that the average
age of sons is about ten years younger than that of fathers.
The average age of a father was 39 in 19 67, while the
average age of a son was 29 in 1986. Our choice of an S4
type of sample was essentially guided by the need of having 
a large enough data set. When necessary, observations of a 
specific nature were deleted in order to examine the likely 
impact of their omission on the conclusions previously 
reached.
variable mean standard deviation
father's age in 1967 38.87 7.56
father's wage in 1967 3 .43 2.15
Son's age in 1987 28.89 5.18
Son's wage in 1987 10.8 7 .76
Table 0.1: Ages and hourly earnings of fathers and sons
Another important pattern which comes out from table 
0.1, is the seemingly higher degree of earnings inequality 
for the generation of children. For instance in taking the 
coefficient of variation (the standard deviation divided by
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the mean), k = 0.718 for children, while k=0.628 for 
fathers. The years 1967 and 1987 pertain to two distinct 
periods with regards to the evolution of earnings inequality 
in the United States. The period 1945-1973 was one of rapid 
earnings growth, and saw a doubling of real wages together 
with a moderate rise of earnings inequality. On the other 
hand, the period 1979-87 saw a rapid increase in inequality 
around an apparently stagnant mean (especially for men)(3). 
The February 1992 issue of the Quarterly Journal of 
Economics contains several studies on the changes in the 
distribution of earnings in the U.S. during the eighties. 
The survey of Levy and Murnane (1992) devotes considerable 
attention to the vanishing of the middle classes, while the 
study of Hanratty and Blank (1992) focuses more on the 
evolution of poverty during the 1980s. On the whole, 
inequality increases were ascribed to between and within 
group factors. Between group factors appear related to the 
rise in the education and experience premiums. Within group 
factors (i.e. increasing pay differences between 
observationally equivalent workers) have been partly 
explained by phenomena such as increasing returns to skills, 
increasing industry specific wage differences, and also to 
plant specific factors within the same industry.
It does not automatically follow that the study of 
intergenerational mobility should focus on the earnings of 
parents and children as opposed to other variables such as 
family income or wealth. We will have more to say on this 
point in section 4.5 of chapter 4. At this stage though we 
should distinguish two main stances in the intergenerational 
mobility literature. One approach views parents as 
maximizing their utility over their own consumption and the 
children's welfare (typically Loury (1981)). The second 
approach made popular by the work of Becker (1981), assumes 
parents maximize their utility over their own consumption 
and their off-springs1 income as opposed to his welfare.
(^) There is growing evidence that this observed trend may largely due to 
measurement errors involved with earnings surveys. See Heckman (1993) for a 
discussion.
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The latter approach has received more attention than 
the former, and empirical work has mainly evolved around the 
theme of testing the inheritance of economic success as 
opposed to economic welfare. A consensus has then grown 
around the assumption that hourly earnings reflect best 
individuals economic success, so that most recent empirical 
studies today consist of examining how earnings of parents 
and children correlate (for e.g. Behrman and Taubman 
(1990)). Nonetheless if we wish to investigate the 
association between the welfare levels of parents and 
children, as opposed to the inheritance of economic success, 
the choice of income over earnings would leave little room 
for dispute. A family income-to-needs index would then be a 
more accurate indicator of family welfare than an earnings 
variable (in this context see Solon (1992)).
We now turn to the question of population
representativeness. The PSID being a national probability 
sample, it is more likely to meet the requirements of 
condition (2) than in the case of previous studies. For 
instance the sample analyzed by Atkinson et al.(1983) was 
limited to low income parents living in the city of York. 
York is hardly representative of the U.K., nor are low 
income families a random sample in terms of socio-economic 
characteristics, also, the study of Behrman and Taubman 
(1985) was based on a sample of white male twins who served 
in the armed forces. While the PSID started as a 
representative sample of the U.S. (though see the discussion 
above), its reliability over the years has been hindered by 
the inevitable attrition problem, common to longitudinal 
data sets.
The attrition problem in the PSID was the subject of 
the study of Becketti et al. (1988). They reported a 
tendency for the panel to lose low income and high income 
individuals, so that the middle income classes became over­
represented with the years.
"Individuals in SEO sample households are more likely to leave than 
those in SRC [non-SEO families] sample households, even after
14
controlling for income. Low-income and high-income individuals are 
more likely to leave than those in the middle income categories. 
Sample [non-SEO] individuals collecting welfare in the last period are 
more likely to leave."
They concluded though that the attrition bias was quite 
moderate, though "the issue of the randomness of attrition 
should be considered carefully by each user of the data".
With regard to the third prerequisite stated above, it 
has become common practice to discard observations 
relating to individuals below the age of 25, because their 
current earnings were unrepresentative of their long term 
earnings profiles. There is also the factor of measurement 
error in the reporting of earnings and employment status, 
which tends to be unusually high amongst low skilled
individuals and young workers(4) . Since 98% of fathers , 
and 83.4 % of sons were above 25, our data set did not
appear to be highly faulty in this context. Lillard and
Willis (1978) have estimated in the PSID that the
transitory variations were an important component of 
observed earnings. The auto-correlation coefficient of an 
individual's earnings over a six year period was of the 
order of 0.7. Thus there appears to be a substantial level 
of intra-generational mobility which is bound to put limits 
on the inferences that we may wish to make about the degree 
of mobility between generations.
Finally, before we embark on a study of this nature, it 
is wise to caution against making any strong conclusions on 
the basis of earnings data. In chapter 4 we will discuss the 
choice of the appropriate indicator of life-time income. 
Whether we select annual income, earnings, or hourly wages, 
we are severely limited by the inaccuracy with which 
earnings data are reported. The precision of income data is 
dependent on the accuracy with which earnings are reported. 
Likewise, hourly wage data will only be reliable if annual 
earnings and work hours are correctly reported.
(4) See the evidence in Bound et al. (1989).
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The cross-validation study of Bound et al. (1989) 
consisted in comparing earnings reported by a sample of 
workers, with the data available form company records. It 
has shed important light on the nature of measurement error 
in the PSID. The usual assumptions that measurement errors 
have zero means and are uncorrelated with true values (i.e. 
company records), do not find any comfort when confronted 
with empirical evidence. Furthermore, the amount of 
measurement error appears considerable. The correlation 
between (log) reported earnings and true values is 0.81. 
This figure further drops to 0.56 for (log) hourly earnings. 
For (log) work hours, the correlation between reported 
values and company records is about 0.64. Also, workers 
with below average annual earnings tend to over-report their 
earnings, while workers with above average annual earnings 
tend to under-report their pay.
From the discussion above, it comes out that our data 
set is far from meeting the ideal conditions for the study 
of intergenerational mobility. Nonetheless, to the extent 
that parents and children are observed twenty years apart, 
that the attrition problem is inevitable in studies which 
span over such a long time interval, and that a large 
majority of fathers and sons were above 25 years of age at 
the time the data on their earnings were collected, and 
finally that wave XX of the PSID has not been the subject of 
a study of this nature, we found it worthwhile to carry 
out the data analysis, of which the main findings are 
contained in the next chapters.
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CHAPTER 1
Identifying the Poor: a Multiple Indicator Approach
1.1 Introduction
Two important aspects of any empirical study of poverty 
are what are known as the identification and aggregation 
issues. The identification rule dictates how we decide who 
is poor and often, but not always, it deals with the 
question of how poor the person is. The aggregation step 
enables us then to take the individual poverty data, and to 
summarize them into an economy-wide measure of poverty. For 
instance when we use the head-count to study the incidence 
of poverty, we label a person as poor if he falls under the 
poverty line. The head-count measure is the proportion of 
the population that is below the specified poverty line.
In this chapter we will be concerned with the 
identification problem in face of imperfect information. 
Assume that underlying our study of poverty lies a social 
welfare function W(yi,...yn; y*) where yi denotes the income 
status of family i, and y* is the poverty line. The 
identification rule then consists of separating families 
into two groups. The group for which y<y* is that of the 
poor. The families for which y>y* are members of the second 
group; the non-poor . The problem we are dealing with in this 
chapter is that of the identification of the poor when y is 
not observed, or is subject to measurement error. The income 
status of a family may be measured with error because it is 
systematically under-reported. If families may benefit from 
various welfare programmes when their incomes are low, they 
may have an incentive to understate their resources. 
Glewwe(1990) adopts this point of view in his work on the 
"efficient allocation of transfers to the poor". There are 
of course other reasons why y may be unobservable in 
practice. If the pertinent variable to welfare analysis is 
the long run economic status of the family ( e.g. its
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permanent income ) , then one must recognize that static 
indicators such as current income and consumption, may be 
noisy correlates of long run income status. In our work we 
will adopt this long run income, interpretation of y.
When y is unobserved, one may attempt to isolate its 
least noisy indicator, as Anand and Harris (1991) and 
Chaudhuri and Ravallion(1992) have done. However, one cannot 
ignore the fact that the most commonly used indicators of 
well-being, namely income and consumption, often offer 
different information about the composition of the poor: 
some families may cross the poverty line in the income space 
but not in the consumption space, and vice versa. It is not 
clear though why we should not simultaneously exploit 
information about various indicators of welfare. If, let us 
say, consumption is a good indicator of permanent income, 
is it reasonable to assume that it exhausts all the 
necessary information about the latter variable?
The aim of this chapter can be stated as follows: 
starting from a set X of p observed indicators on the 
family's socio-economic characteristics (for example: 
income, consumption, and employment situation of head), we 
want to construct a summary statistic of the family's long 
run income status y . The task of constructing such an index 
can be stated in the language of multivariate statistics, as 
one of reducing the dimensionality of the data from p to one 
dimension. As this is not a new problem in statistics, we 
have a vast literature and many results to draw from.
The index we select must achieve the reduction of the 
dimension of the data, without losing any available 
information contained in X, about y. That is, the index must 
be a sufficient statistic for y. One such statistic we 
propose to use is the regression function of y conditional 
upon X. Below, we will refer to it as the multiple indicator 
index.
To arrive at the multiple indicator index, we will 
proceed in the following steps. In section 1.2 we discuss 
why the two rival indicators of welfare, namely income and 
consumption, are not likely to rank families in terms of
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their well-being in an identical fashion. We also take a 
first look at our income and consumption data, and note the 
existence of conflicting conclusions offered by the two 
indicators. In section 1.3, we postulate the statistical 
relation between the indicators X and the unobserved income 
status of the family, y. We assume that the correlation 
between the various indicators arises out of their common 
dependence on y. This formulation leads us to adopt the 
model of factor analysis in describing the relation between 
the indicators and the unobservable. Within the context of a 
simplified example of.the. life-cycle model, we discuss the 
inferential problems involved with the factor analysis 
model. We then derive the multiple indicator index, which 
enables us to summarize the information about y.
In section 1.4 we illustrate the multiple indicator 
approach.using a sample of 910 families, extracted from wave 
XX of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. We then construct 
two classification matrices, where observations are ranked 
using the multiple indicator index, and each of the two 
commonly used indicators; consumption and income. These 
matrices offer greater scope for agreement concerning the 
ranking of families, than in the case where observations are 
ranked on the basis of income and consumption. We therefore 
summarize the results obtained from the suggested method, as 
being a "middle of the road" solution as an alternative to 
working with either of the two indicator separately. In 
section 1.5 we comment further on the use of the multiple 
indicator method, especially with respect to the limitations 
of its applicability. Section 1.6 concludes the chapter.
1.2 The Problem
As a first step to any study on the extent of poverty 
we have to specify the choice of our indicator variable of 
welfare. Let x denote such an indicator, and x* the 
specified poverty line. Should we define the standard as an 
income measure x* or should it be expenditure X2 ? 
Conflicting conclusions can arise when one indicator is 
chosen at the expense of another. Consider first the case
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when xi < xi* and X2 > X2 *. In Crime and Punishment, 
Dosteyevsky writes the following:
" . . .  possibly what weighed with her most was 'the poor man's pride' 
which makes poor people who are faced with the necessity of observing 
certain of our traditional customs strain every nerve and spend their 
last savings so that they should be 'as good as everybody else' and 
that no one 'could have a wrong word to say against them'".
Thus, a family may be able to reach a decent level of 
expenditure by temporarily borrowing or running down its 
assets. On the other hand, a situation where xi> xi* and X2 
< X2 * can occur when there exist market imperfections due to 
information problems, discrimination, and other obstacles to 
trade. A well-off black family may afford a rent in a white 
suburb , but may be obliged to live on the other side of the 
railroad tracks due to the reasons mentioned above.
The need for examining multiple indicators of welfare 
has long been recognized in development economics. For 
instance, in their study of economic mobility and 
agricultural labour in Rural India, Dreze et al.(1992) write 
the following:
"One may however question whether current per-capita income in any 
particular year is a sensible criterion of 'poverty' in economies 
where current incomes are subject to large short-run variations and 
significant mechanisms exist for smoothing out these fluctuations. On 
the basis of alternative criteria of poverty such as per-capita 
expenditure or living standard, it is likely that less mobility would 
be observed. Households which may appear to be "crossing the poverty 
line " in particular years in the income space may, in fact, be 
chronically poor in terms of expenditure or living standards."
Also, Glewwe and Van der Gaag (1990) test on L.D.C. data the 
consequences of using various definitions of deprivation in 
identifying the poor. They conclude that the choice of a 
resource variable matters significantly , in the sense that 
different definitions identify different groups of the 
population as poor. The problem of conflicting results
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subject to the use of different indicators is not confined 
to the case of developing countries alone. Mcgregor and 
Boorah (1992) report substantial rerankings of individuals 
using income and expenditure data for the U.K. .
It is worthwhile asking the question as to when one can 
safely use one indicator instead of another; i.e. , under 
what circumstances is it that the problem of selecting a 
specific indicator amongst several, ceases to be a 
"problem" . Let us once more restrict ourselves to the case 
where the choice is between two indicators: income (xi), and 
consumption (X2 ). We also abstract from the borrowing and 
other quantity constraints mentioned earlier. Then,
(i) if the correlation between xi and X2 is equal 
to unity, one can use the information on either indicator to 
identify the poor.
(ii) one could weaken the condition (i), in requiring 
that the ordering of individuals by xi and X2 be preserved. 
The choice between xi and X2 would be unimportant provided 
the rank correlation between the two variables were unity.
,x2
x *2
xl
x* 1
FIGURE 1.1: Income and consumption poverty lines.
One could then also convert the poverty line in terms of xi 
into a poverty line in terms of X2 -
The Keynesian consumption function is a typical example 
of condition (i) above. With a simple linear relation of the
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type X2 = a+bxi, the income poverty line x*i is mapped into 
a consumption poverty line x*2 =a+bx*i, leaving the 
identification of the poor invariant to the choice of 
indicator.
The linear consumption function is not likely to be of 
much relevance at the microeconomic level, unless we have a 
good reason to assume that savings do not respond to the 
interest rate. As mentioned above, we need not restrict 
ourselves to a linear relation between income and 
consumption, any one-to-one relation will serve our 
purposes. Deaton(1992) ch. 1, offers several reasons why one 
cannot expect consumption to closely follow income. One 
explanation relates to the fact that the marginal utility of 
consumption may vary along the stages of the life-cycle, 
especially with respect to the demographic structure of the 
household. More importantly, when we incorporate uncertainty 
in the course of the life-cycle, we note that the 
consumption patterns of households may substantially vary 
because of their different abilities to bear risk. As Deaton 
(p.19) very well summarizes the fact:
"In an uncertain world, the substitution of future consumption for 
current consumption inevitably increases exposure to risk, and those 
who are willing to contemplate the former must be willing to face the 
latter."
Life-cycle income would then be a key variable in the 
ability to bear risk. Looking at the relationship between 
current income and consumption only, would leave us with 
an incomplete, and possibly, inaccurate picture. A priori 
therefore, we cannot assume a one-to-one relation between 
consumption and income. We would thus expect a substantial 
reranking of families according to which of the two 
indicators we use.
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Data
At this stage, it is worth confronting the evidence by 
taking a first look at the data we will be making use of in 
this chapter. We have data on income to needs ratio, food 
budget share, as well as employment status for 910 American 
families. These observations were extracted from the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics, and pertain to 1986. The families 
are male-headed and constitute the cross-section of the 
second generation from the Fathers and Sons sample we shall 
be working with throughout the thesis. There are 945 
families in the data set, but in the applications below we 
lose 35 observations because of missing values for the 
consumption variable. The point to note here is that the 
families retained all have a head who is participating in 
the labour force. Thus, individuals in full time education, 
elderly families, and other households who are not in the 
labour force are excluded from the analysis. The consequence 
of this selection rule is that families for which income is 
low and consumption is (relatively) high, may be under­
represented.
The income variable is defined as the annual taxable 
income of the family, standardized by the Orshansky scale(1) . 
The food budget share is constructed as the ratio of annual 
food expenditure to the taxable income of the head and wife. 
Annual expenditure on food excludes food purchased with food 
stamps, and is limited to purchases for domestic use only. 
Families are asked the question "How much do you (or anyone 
else in your family) spend on food that you use at home in 
an average week?" The figure is then multiplied by 52 to 
arrive at the annual food consumption value. One should 
expect a substantial amount of inaccuracy to be involved 
with such data: respondents are likely to give more or less 
reliable information depending on how often they do the 
shopping, and also on the time horizon they use in 
estimating the average weekly expenditure on food.
( The Orshansky scale is based on the annual food requirements of families. 
Per capita needs in a family comprising four individuals is the reference 
point, say 100. Then, for a single person, p.c. needs rise to 120. The figure 
drops to 110 for two persons, 105 for three, 95 for five, and 90 for six or 
more individuals.
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Ideally we would want to use an expenditure to needs 
ratio for the consumption indicator. However the PSID does 
not possess as refined data on consumption as the ones 
available on income. Noting that food consumption is 
typically an inferior good (at least in developed 
countries), a negative correlation between the income to 
needs ratio and food budget share is to be expected. In our 
data, it is of the order of -0.3. In the matrix below, we 
classify our observations line-wise in order of increasing 
income, and column-wise in decreasing order of food budget 
share. We adopt a quartile .classification, so that income 
and consumption classes are of equal size, and contain 
exactly one quarter of the families.
T(X!,X2) =
138 51 23 15
65 8 8 51 24
20 6 6 8 6 55
5 22 6 8 113
By examining the off-diagonal elements of the matrix, one 
notes the extent of divergence in the classification of 
observations by the two indicators. A test of
independence between xi and X2 is quite expectedly rejected 
at 99%. While the indicators do not rank the families 
identically, there is a correlation between classifications 
obtained by the two variables (this result is not surprising 
since the correlation between xi and X2 is -0.3). The extent 
of disagreement between the two indicators in the ranking of 
families can be quantified by counting the ratio of off- 
diagonal elements to the total number of observations. There 
are 465 out of 910 families ranked differently by xi and X2 , 
thus over 50% of the total. By setting the poverty line at 
a particular level for each indicator, we may of course 
observe that agreement between the two indicators may be 
higher or lower for this subset of individuals, than for the 
entire population. On the other hand, there is no general 
agreement on how, and at what level to set the poverty line. 
It would therefore appear more reasonable to discuss the 
adequacy of specific indicators in the applied analysis of
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living standards independently of where we may wish to set 
the poverty line. We will thus examine the performance of 
the indicators on the entire range of the population, rather 
than limit ourselves to a specific subset.
Nonetheless, as a simple exercise, assume that the 
poverty line is set on a relative basis, so that the bottom 
25%, ranked according to a specific indicator, are defined 
as the poor. Then, from our classification matrix T we see 
that 13 8 families are ranked poor by both indicators; 
whereas 227 (i.e. 902/4) by construction, are identified as 
poor using each of the income and consumption indicators. In 
40% of cases, the most popular indicators, income and 
consumption, identify different families as being in 
poverty. This result is largely in conformity with many 
economic theories of consumption. Since income is correlated 
with consumption, one indeed expects that the classification 
using the two indicators does not exhibit a pattern of 
independence. On the other hand , since the relationship 
between current income and consumption is not one-to-one, 
the ranking of individuals according to the two indicators 
is not likely to be uniform. We thus conclude this section 
by stating that indeed the choice between indicators in 
identifying the poor is a "problem".
1.3 A Multiple Indicator Approach
The evidence that alternative indicators offer 
different information concerning the identification of the 
poor, can be interpreted in three different ways. The first 
argument would be to say that there exists a proper 
indicator of welfare, say income, and to postulate that 
consumption is related to it through an economic law of the 
type:
X2 = a+bxi + e
where e is a random term. The researcher is then entitled to 
prefer xi to X2 . This is probably the status-quo amongst 
researchers today, divided between those who favour the
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choice of consumption, and those who opt for income. 
Chaudhuri and Ravallion(1992) write:
"Current consumption expenditure and current income have been the most 
popular welfare indicators in applied welfare analysis. Of the two, 
current consumption expenditure has probably been more widely used 
for research and policy purposes, at least in developing countries."
An alternative approach is to argue that both income and 
consumption are correlates of an unobserved variable, which 
is pertinent to welfare analysis. For example, if our main 
concern is with chronic, rather than transient poverty, one 
would expect current income and consumption to be noisy 
measures of long term economic status. This time, the 
preference for xi over X2 could be motivated on the basis 
that xi is a noisy indicator of a variable y, defined as 
long term economic status, and as before, X2 is a noisy 
indicator of xi. The problem arises because y typically is 
not observable. For example, if y is permanent income, there 
is no direct way of measuring it. Thus, permanent income is 
to be treated as a latent variable. Let us write a simple 
system of equations relating xi ,X2 , and y.
X2 = a+ bxi +w 
xi = y + e
We see that X2 will also be a noisy indicator of y. 
Substituting xi into the equation for X2 , we get:
X2= a+by + v
where the variance of v equals b2var(e)+var(w). The error 
term for X2 is correlated with that of xi, and the variance 
of X2 conditional on y, is greater than the corresponding
one for xi when var(w) > (l-b2)var(e) . In this sense, xi may
be a better indicator of y.
Anand and Harris (1991) essentially adopt the above 
framework in their analysis of living standards in Sri-
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Lanka. Under certain conditions they are able to show that 
if Xi is more variable than Xj, average savings in a given 
population decile will be lower when families are ranked 
according to xi than when they are ranked according to Xj . 
This result then allows them to perform pair-wise 
comparisons on the relative variability of some commonly 
used indicators of living standards.
The third explanation regarding the fact that 
alternative indicators offer different information with 
respect to the identification of the poor, is to be found in 
the assumption that the indicators are jointly correlated 
through their common dependence on y. This is the approach 
we pursue in this work. Let g(xi|y) denote the probability 
density function of xi when y is held fixed. We let xi and 
X2 be related to y through the following system:
xi = y + ui
(3.1)
* 2 = fcy + u 2
Define y as permanent income, xi as current income, and ui 
transitory income. According to Friedman (1957) p.21,
"The permanent component is to be interpreted as reflecting the effect 
of those factors that the unit regards as determining its capital 
value or wealth. ... The transitory component is to be interpreted as 
reflecting all 'other' factors."
We also let X2 denote current consumption expenditure and U2 
be a disturbance term in the consumption equation. 
Equations (3.1) defines a pure life-cycle model, where 
current income and consumption are endogenous variables and 
are functions of permanent income. The decomposition of 
observed income, xi, into permanent and transitory 
components, dates back to the work of Friedman and Kuznets 
(1945) on income inequality in the United States. The 
equation for X2 was subsequently added by Friedman (1957) in 
his work on the consumption function. As with current
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income, observed consumption was decomposed into a permanent 
component 0 2y and transitory element U2 -
The assumption that the correlation between xi and X2 
is solely induced by y can be formally stated as follows:
g(xi,X2 | y) = g(xi|y) . g(x2|y)
That is, when y is held fixed, xi and X2 must be
independent. The above condition is known as the axiom of 
conditional independence. From the stated axiom, it follows 
that
cov(ui,U2 ) = 0  (3.2)
Note that now the disturbances are uncorrelated, whereas
when we assume X2 is a function of xi, the error term in 
the consumption equation is a function of the error term of 
of the income equation. In contrast to this, in the present 
set-up, a priori all indicators have a symmetric status with 
respect to y.
Our question is the following: can one use the
information available from the two indicators, in order to 
predict the permanent income of the family? The answer 
hinges upon the identifiability of the model (3.1). The 
first step thus consists of examining the identification of 
the model relating the observed variables X=[xi,x2 ], to the 
unobservable y. If we can estimate all the structural 
parameters of the model, than, in a second step we can
attempt to construct an index of the family's permanent 
income.
Let us first examine the identification of model (3.1). 
The question of identification can alternatively be stated 
as follows: from the sample moments available to us, can we 
identify 0 2 / and the variance of the two error terms, say 
®ll/®22 ?
Noting that we have three sample moments var(xi), 
var(x 2 ), and cov(xi,X2 ), we can write the following 
identities relating sample and population moments:
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var( xi ) =var(y) + con
v a r (  X2) = P22v a r  (y ) + CO22 <3.3)
cov( x i  X 2) = P2 v a r  (y)
To simplify the problem further, assume xi and X2 have 
been standardized so that var (xi) =var <X2 )=1. We note from 
( 3 . 3 )  that in order to identify the structural parameters of 
the model, we need to know the variance of y, which we will 
denote as Yyy- Because Yyy is unknown, the model ( 3 . 1 )  is not 
identified.
Let us set cov(xi X2 ) at 0 . 3 ,  the sample correlation 
between our income and consumption indicators. In the table 
below, we consider various values of Yyy, and the 
corresponding estimates of the structural parameters. Note 
that in order for us to obtain any meaningful results, the 
variance of y has to be restricted to the interval 0 <Yyy<l.
Yyy fc
con ®22
0.25
0.5
1.2
0.6
0.4
0.3
0.75
0.5
0.64
0.82
0.75 0.25 0 .88
1 0 0.91
TABLE 1.1: Identification of model 3.1 through moment restrictions.
The introduction of prior information about Yyy maY leave 
the practitioner uneasy, since different beliefs about the 
variance of the unobservable y, tend to produce different 
parameter estimates for the structural coefficients relating 
the indicators to y.
As a way out of the under-identification problem of the 
life-cycle model (3.1), Friedman suggested to "compute" 
permanent income as a weighted average of current and past 
values of observed income:
Xl.t + J *l,t-l + | j 2Xi,t_2 + ( 3 . 4 )
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where x1>t_s denotes observed income s years from the 
present. Friedman went back 17 years in time and accordingly 
estimated the coefficient P2 of the consumption equation at a 
value of 0 .8 8 .
Though often used in practice, the above formulation 
has been criticized by many researchers as being rather ad- 
hoc. Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) pp. 325-26 argue that 
"such a procedure is fraught with difficulties". One concern 
they raise is that:
"No account is taken of expectations about unemployment nor about the 
effects of current inflation rates upon anticipated future levels of 
income."
One thus has to rely on alternative routes to resolving 
the identification problem*2). As pointed out by Goldberger 
(1972) , the way out of the problem, is to assume the 
availability of another indicator of y (3). If y is long term 
income status, then we can assume that say, asset holdings 
of the family, are also informative about y. Let X3 denote 
this third indicator. The model (3.1), augmented by one 
extra equation is written below.
XI = y + Ul
x2 = P2 y + U2 (3.5)
x 3 = P 3y + U 3
Maintaining the independence of the error terms, we can 
write down the moment restrictions relating the structural 
parameters and sample moments:
*2) Under some distributional assumptions, third and higher order moments may 
contain further information that can be used to identify the model. We 
therefore note that it is not always the case that with only two indicators 
the model is under-identified.
*3 ) A similar approach is followed by Van Praag et al.(1983) in the 
measurement of inequality, when income is subject to measurement error.
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var( xi ) = Y y y +  coi 1 
var ( X2 ) = Yyy p22 + C022 
var ( x3) = Yyy p32 + 0)33
cov ( xi , X2 ) = Yyy p2
cov( xi , x3) = Yyy p3
COV ( X2 / x3) = Yyy P2 P3
Let Oij denote cov(xi x-j) , solving the six equations above
we obtain the following solutions:
Yyy = <*12 .^ 1 3 / <*23 0) n  = O n  . <T12.<*13 / <*23
p2 =  <*23/<*13 0)22 =  <*22 - <*12.<*23/<*13
P 3 =  <*23. /  <*12 0)33  = a 33 . <*23.<*13 / <*12
It is more convenient to set Yyy= l  an<3 to introduce a slope 
parameter pi for the equation relating the indicator xi to 
y. Under such normalization pi becomes the correlation 
coefficient between x^ and y (and writing the moment 
equation for xi, we see that Pi is equal to Yyy) •
The general model relating the indicators X to y is 
written as follows:
Xl " Pi Ul
Xp I
... 
ft
CO.
i
y +
_ Up
or, in a more compact notation:
X= Py + U (3.7)
Model (3.7) is known as the factor analysis model. An 
important feature of the model is the additive structure of 
the covariance matrix of the observables:
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2  = v a r ( x ) =  pp1 + Q ( 3 . 8 )
The variance of X thus consists of a component pp1
originating from the joint dependence of the indicators on 
y, together with a component Q arising from the presence of
the disturbance terms.
A necessary condition for identification, is that the 
number of observed moments is no less than the number of 
free parameters (that is, the number of parameters to 
estimate). For the factor model (3.7), there are 2p 
parameters to estimate, from p(p+l)/2 observed moments 
contained in the p x p sample covariance matrix. Define d 
as the difference p(p+l)/2-2p. We have three cases to 
consider:
i) d < 0
ii) d = 0
iii) d > 0
When d < 0, there may exist an infinity of solutions, and 
the model is said to be under-identified. When d=0, there 
exist as many observed sample moments of 2 as there are
parameters to estimate, and the model is just-identified. We 
can therefore hope to obtain a unique set of estimates. 
Finally, when d>0, the model is over-identified. As comes 
out from our earlier discussion, d £ 0 only when we have 
three indicators or more.
Estimation
There are two ways of dealing with the estimation of 
the factor analysis model. The first approach consists in 
specifying the distribution g(X/y) of the indicators. The 
second approach does not assume any underlying distribution 
for the indicators, and selects estimates 6* from the 
problem of minimizing a distance F[S,2(6)] between the sample 
covariance matrix S, and the matrix 2(6) induced by the 
model. Here we discuss the distribution-free method.
The main advantage of opting for least squares 
estimation methods, is that their consistency is guarantied
32
for all distributions of X, provided the model is 
identified. The Generalized Least Squares estimator 
minimizes the distance
Fgls [S,Z(8)] = trace [(S- X)V]2
so that the criterion consists of minimizing the sum of 
squares between the various elements of S and E, where the 
distances are measured in the metric of V. When we choose 
V=I , we are in fact choosing estimators to minimize:
j [ (sij “ tfij)]2
So that the choice of V=I induces an ordinary least squares 
method. Amongst the class of GLS estimators, the optimal 
choice of V (from an efficiency point of view) is a matrix 
which converges in probability to E'1 . For this reason the 
choice of V = S-1 is immediate in practice. Conditional on 
the appropriate choice of V, the GLS estimator is Best 
Asymptotic Normal (BAN) under fairly general conditions. 
Sufficient conditions are that the X's are independent and 
identically distributed, and that fourth order moments are 
finite. The asymptotic covariance matrix of the GLS 
estimator is a factor 2 /n which multiplies the inverse of 
the information matrix (viz the inverse of the expected 
value of Hessian matrix, evaluated at 5*). Finally, we 
state an important result relating ML, GLS, and OLS. When a 
model is just-identified, all three estimators will produce 
identical solutions.
If we assume that X is a multivariate normal vector, 
the goodness of fit of the model can be assessed by means of 
a x2 test, provided estimates are obtained by means of ML or 
GLS techniques. Under the null hypothesis that the model is 
correct, the statistic [n-1],F[ S, E(S) ] is distributed as 
a X 2d' where d is the difference between the number of 
sample moments, and the number of parameters that require 
estimation. The drawback of this test is clear: even if 2(8) 
were close to S, a large n would invariably lead to the
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rejection of the model. Another problem is that slight 
departures from normality, ( e.g. a distribution with some 
kurtosis) , render the y} statistic a poor approximation of
the required test.
An alternative way of evaluating the fit of the model 
is to use the coefficient of determination CD:
CD = 1 - det( Q) / det(S)
The coefficient of determination is one way of assessing how 
well the indicators jointly serve the purpose of measuring 
the latent variables. The range of values of CD is [0,1]. A
poor fit of the model is associated with a value of CD close
to zero.
We have now informally discussed the identification and 
estimation of the model relating the indicators to the 
observable long term income status of the family unit<4). 
Other than ranking indicators in terms of their correlation
with y, it is not clear how the above method might provide
helpful guide-lines in identifying the poor. For example 
assume we estimate the model with three indicators, and say 
we find that the coefficient on income Pi, is estimated at 
0.8, while the coefficient on consumption p2 , is equal to 
0.5, and that on assets, p3 , equals 0.2. We may then decide 
that out of the three indicators, current income xi should 
be selected because of its greatest association with 
permanent income. The above statement is equivalent to 
saying that xi is the least noisy indicator of y, since the 
variance of Ui decreases as pi rises.
As an alternative to selecting the least noisy 
indicator of y, we may wish to pool the information
available from all the indicators in order to predict, in a 
sense, the permanent income of the families. One can then 
hope to rank the families in terms of their predicted
permanent incomes, and separate them out between poor and
(4) Alternative expositions of the identification problem can be found in 
Goldberger(1972), and in Greene(1991) pp.531-35. The texts of Everitt (1984) and 
Bartholomew(1987) give a more detailed discussion of the question.
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non-poor, according to a specified level of the poverty- 
line .
The task of predicting y, having observed X, requires 
the derivation of the distribution of y conditional on X. At 
this stage it is necessary to make assumptions regarding the 
joint distribution of X and y, denoted as f(X,y). Having 
specified the parametric form of f(X,y), one can use Bayes' 
rule to arrive at h(y|x):
h(y|X) = f(X,y)/ J f(X ,y )dy
In terms of the general model (3.7) relating the observed 
variables X to the unobservable y, we assume that U~N(0,£2), 
and y~N(0,l). It follows that
X | y ~ N ( J3 y, Q  ) (3.9)
and X ~ N ( 0 ; pp' + Q )
Then we can use some properties of the normal distribution
(e.g. see Greene(1991) p.78) to establish that the
conditional distribution h( y | X) is also normal:
y | X ~ N [ p' E _1 X ; 1- P'Z-1 P] (3 .10)
where E was defined in (3.8) as being the variance of the 
vector X of indicators.
We use the mean of h(y|x) as our index of long run
income, i.e.
E(y |X) = P' I " 1 X (3.11)
The suggested index is the regression function of y 
conditional upon X, and is a linear function of the 
indicators. Before we further discuss the multiple indicator 
approach, we analyse our data using the suggested method. 
Let \j/ denote E(y|x). Below we refer to \j/ as the multiple 
indicator index.
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1.4 An Illustration
We now illustrate the multiple indicator method on the 
basis of a sample of 910 families, extracted from wave XX of 
the U.S. based, Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
In a first stage we report results for the estimation 
of the model (3.7) relating three indicators, X, to an 
unobserved welfare standard y. Then we will construct the 
multiple indicator index E(y|x) of (3.11), and examine the 
insights it offers into identifying the poor. The X 
variables are the following:
xi : family income to needs ratio.
x2 : food expenditure/total taxable income of head
and wife.
X3 : total annual employment hours of head/ total
annual employment+ unemployment hours of family head.
The three indicators can be taken to be correlates of 
permanent income. We would expect pi and p3 to be 
positive. Even when leisure is a normal good, we expect P3 
to be positive, since the state of being unemployed is 
different from that of being out of the labour force 
altogether. We expect P2 to be negative, since food 
consumption is an inferior good. We do not have other 
sources of information on consumption of non-durables in the 
PSID other than the annual household expenditure of the 
family on food.
The sample correlation matrix is the following:
S = -0.3005 1
0.2099 -0.2271
Parameter estimates of the model X= py + U are reported in 
table 1 . 2 below:
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parameter Pi P2 P3 0)11 0>22 0>3 3
estimate 0.527 -0.570 0.398 0.722 0.675 0.841
t-value 9.238 -9.475 8.250 11.857 10.045 17.197
Table 1.2: Parameter estimates and t-values
The coefficient of determination, which is defined as 1-
det (£2) /det (S) takes the value 0.513.
Our coefficients are of the predicted signs. The
coefficient for the employment ratio p3 , is estimated to be 
about 0.4. While the coefficient of determination is not 
very impressive, we should note that all six parameter 
estimates are all highly significant.
Having estimated the structural parameters of the
model, we can now derive our multiple indicator index y, on
the basis of (3.11) (5) :
\|f = E(y|X)= 0.36xi -0.41x2 +0 .2 3 x3
We note that the budget share of food in this first
application is assigned the highest weight. It is followed
in importance by the income variable. The variable that 
carries least weight is the employment indicator of the 
family head.
In order to assess the impact of using \|/ in the 
identification of the poor, we construct a 4 by 4
classification matrix where families are ranked line-wise by
current income xi, and column-wise using the multiple 
indicator index \|f :
(5) To obtain the coefficients of V, pre-multiply the inverse of the 
correlation matrix by the vector of estimates of p.
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175 52 0 0
43 144 41 0
7 31 173 16
2 1 13 212
The main diagonal now contains 704 families (that is 77.4% 
of the families are ranked identically by \|f and xi) . Using 
income and consumption, agreement was possible only in 445 
cases (see the matrix T(xi,X2 ) in section 2 ). In this sense, 
wherever we choose to set the poverty line, we are likely to 
find a closer ranking of families using income and \|f .
Let us now contrast the classification of families 
using consumption X2 , and the multiple indicator index 
\|/(X) . We rank families line-wise in order of decreasing food 
budget share, and column-wise in increasing order of \y.
169 50 6 3
39 113 59 16
13 48 1 0 0 67
6 17 62 142
The main diagonal now contains 524 families, as opposed to 
the 445 families in the classification by xi and X2 . Let us 
summarize these results by means of a Venn diagram. When the 
poverty line is set at the bottom quartile of a given 
variable, each indicator will identify 227 families as being 
poor. As shown in figure 1.2, income, consumption, and the 
multiple indicator index, jointly identify 135 families as 
being in poverty. A further three families are commonly 
identified by xi and X2 . The multiple indicator index has in 
common with the income definition the 135 observations plus 
another 40 family units. Together with consumption, \j/ ranks 
another 34 families as being in poverty. Furthermore, we 
note that \j/ has the largest intersection with the two other 
sets, with a remaining 18 families non-poor according to the 
other two definitions.
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consumption
poor
multiple indicator 
S. index poor J
Figure 1.2: Identifying the poor using various definitions, Venn
diagram
In figure 1.3 we draw a scatter diagram of the 227 
families identified as being in poverty using the multiple 
indicator index. To avoid problems of comparison due to 
differing units of measurement, we plot the ranks of the 
observations along the income and consumption definitions. 
The ranks are in deviation of 227(i.e 227 is substracted 
from the family's rank), so that the horizontal and vertical 
lines divide the data into four quadrants. According to this 
representation, the south-west (S.W) quadrant defines the 
13 5 families selected by the multiple indicator index who 
are also poor according to xi and X2 . Likewise, the N.E. 
quadrant locates the 18 families which are identified by Vj/ 
as being in poverty, but not by income and consumption.
The N.W. quadrant locates the 40 families selected by \|f 
which are income poor but not consumption poor. It is 
interesting to note that some of them have very low budget 
shares when compared to the other sample members. Turning to 
the 34 families in the S.E. quadrant, we note that from the 
selected sample, those who are consumption poor but not 
income poor do not have as striking features as those in 
the N.W. quadrant. By this we mean that these 34 families do
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FIGURE 1.3 : Families identified as poor using the multiple indicator
index: scatter plot in the income and consumption space
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not have unexpectedly high income endowments, so that none 
of them appear to behave as outliers in the income space.
Of the remaining 18 families in the N.E. quadrant, 9 
observations do not fall far from the consumption or income 
poverty line. There are another 9 observations, especially 
two in the top right corner which deserve some explanation 
as to their being selected poor by the multiple indicator 
index. These nine observations, together with the outliers 
in the N.W. quadrant, all share the common feature of 
pertaining to families where the family head experienced 
long spells of unemployment during 1986. This pattern is to 
be expected, since the employment indicator x3 is used to 
identify the factor analysis model and to construct the 
multiple indicator index.
Consider now the following exercise: for various values 
of the poverty rate, we wish to explore the extent to which 
income, consumption, and the multiple indicator index vj/ 
identify the same families as being deprived. If we decide 
that say, the lowest ranked 10% are the poor, than we can 
agree on a maximum of 910/10=91 cases. In the table below n 
denotes the poverty rate, and H is the head count of the 
poor.
n H T(xi,X2) T(xi, y) T(x2 ,\J/)
10% 91 47 49 58
14% 130 70 81 86
20% 182 103 132 129
25% 227 138 175 169
Table 1.3 : Further results based on the multiple indicator index
Table 1.3 shows that xi and \j/, and X 2 and \|/, will identify 
more families similarly (between poor versus non-poor) than 
the income and consumption indicators. At the lower values 
of the poverty rate, consumption and yappears to coincide 
more often, while at the higher values of 7C, the pattern
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seems more pronounced between income and the multiple 
indicator index. No conclusions are to be drawn from this 
last statement though. These differences are too small to be 
of any statistical significance.
As a final summary of our results, we compute the 
covariance matrix C between X (first three lines) and the 
multiple indicator index \j/.
C =
1
-0.3005 1
0.2099 -0.2271
0.5270 -0.5700
1
0.3980
As can be seen from the last line, the multiple indicator 
index correlates highest with all three variables in X. Note 
that the correlation between \|/ and X is nothing else than 
the vector p, since E(X'y) =X ' X (X ' X) _1 p and X'X is the 
sample estimate of E. The high degree of association between 
the multiple indicator index and X provides an explanation 
as to why the classification matrices between \y and, income 
and consumption respectively, offered greater scope for 
agreement than the analysis based on xi and X2 . In this 
sense the multiple indicator approach can be seen as a 
middle of the road solution between the use of income versus 
consumption, and vice versa.
1.5 Assessment
We have illustrated the multiple indicator approach 
above, and we have offered the view that it could be used as 
an intermediary solution between the exclusive use of one 
indicator at the expense of others. In this section we 
comment further on some points related to the use of the 
method.
Normative judgements have not been present in our 
discussion so far. And indeed, looking at our index \|/, we 
may be tempted to argue that it is a welfare index, based on 
a linear and additively separable utility function. This is 
certainly not the case. What \|f does is to summarize the 
available information about the unobservable y, this latter
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variable is assumed to be pertinent to welfare analysis. All 
that our approach is aiming at is to draw on information 
from several indicators, as an alternative to using a 
unique noisy indicator variable. Note also that indicators 
such as race, sex, and age of the household head could be 
used as indicators of economic status. However, such 
household characteristics are not choice variables in a 
utility function in the way that bread and meat are.
The problem of constructing an index \|/ from a vector of 
variables X, is not a new problem in multivariate 
statistics. As such we have suggested to work in a factor 
analysis set-up (the model (3.7)). An alternative, perhaps 
better known technique to economists, is that of principal 
component analysis (PCA) . One way to obtain the PCA model 
would consist in omitting the disturbance term in the system 
relating X to y. This would then enable us to express y as 
a linear combination of the x's
y = 8 X
where 8 is defined as the eigen-vector corresponding to the 
largest eigen value of X (6) . In our case it is not y but 
E(y|x) which is constructed as a linear function of X. Thus 
our conclusions are about expected poverty, meaning that if 
two families are observationally equivalent (i.e. their 
observed X vectors are identical) , we expect them to be 
equally off, however due to some unobserved factors (which 
the disturbance term is introduced to account for), one may 
be better off than the other. It is ultimately up to the 
researcher to decide whether PCA or factor analysis is the 
more adequate framework to use in the context of our 
problem. We have opted for factor analysis, because we feel 
that omitting the disturbance term would be way too 
unrealistic. Assuming that income, consumption, and 
employment status, are entirely explained by a common 
unobservable y excluding disturbance terms, may be too 
restrictive a set-up.
See Morrison (1978) pp. 267-75.
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Throughout our presentation, we have assumed that the 
poverty line is to be set on a relative basis, so that the 
ranking of individuals would be informative of their 
economic status. We have not discussed the possibility of 
setting the poverty line on an absolute basis. Nothing in 
practice prevents us from doing so. We could fix a threshold 
\|/*, and separate out families according to their endowments, 
between those who fall short of \\f*, and those who do exceed 
the poverty line.
Two points are worth mentioning at this stage. It is 
often suggested that part of the task of latent variable 
modelling is to estimate the unobservables. It should be 
noted however that the framework laid out here cannot 
produce estimates, but at best, predictions of the extent of 
poverty. This is because estimating values for unobserved 
random variables makes strictly no sense. The second point, 
deals with the definition of the concept of a latent 
variable. It is often the case that investigators in the 
social sciences give names to the unobservable. The idea 
underlying this practice is the belief that the latent 
variables are existing well defined variables, and that the 
problem lies in their measurement. In practice however, 
whether we choose to define y as poverty, human capital, or 
permanent income, it makes no difference to our quantitative 
analysis. The unobservable y contains nothing more than the 
specification of the correlations between the indicators.
In the estimation of structural parameters, criteria 
such as consistency and efficiency will often guide the 
practitioner in his choice of estimation technique. The 
estimators of p and ft we have used are derived from sample 
moments. In just-identified models, the method of moments 
estimator is consistent as well as Best Asymptotic Normal. 
The method of moments estimator also presents the advantage 
of being distribution-free. Thus, the estimators of P and ft 
will be consistent regardless of the exact form of the 
population distribution of X.
We now turn to the statistical properties of the 
multiple indicator index \|/. Firstly we note that it is a
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linear function of the indicators. We also note that it is 
the best linear predictor of y(7) . It should be noted that 
this result is distribution-free. Furthermore, under the 
general normality assumption, \|/ is also the best predictor 
for y(8). Also, when the interdependence of the indicators is 
fully accounted for by their common dependence on y (i.e. 
when the axiom of conditional independence holds), the 
distribution h(y|x) exhausts all the information existing 
in the sample about y. Since X and y are both random 
variables, we can decompose their joint density as follows:
f (X,y) = h(y |X) . g(X)
Thus, all the information available to us about y, is 
contained in the conditional distribution h(y|x). Any index, 
or predictor of y, must therefore be based on h(y|x) . This 
result is due to Bartholomew (1984), where he shows that for 
any g(x|y) member of the exponential family of 
distributions, there exist sufficient summary statistics for 
y, which often turn out to be linear functions of the 
indicators.
Let us show that under the normality assumption the 
multiple indicator index is a sufficient statistic for y. 
The distribution of X when y is held fixed can be written 
as:
g (X |y) = (27T)"p/2 [det (ft) ] _1/2 exp{ - ^-(X-py) ' Q "1 (X-py) } 
and rearranging, we have
g(x|y>= (2jc)~p/2 [dec (£2) ] ~1/2 exp{- j(X'il_1X) }
. exp{- ^y'P'Q-ipy) } . exp{ (X'£2-1Py) }
I thank Danny Quah for pointing out this result to me.
See Amemiya (1985) p. 3 for a discussion regarding best linear and best 
predictors.
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While y is a random variable, the structural parameters of 
the model are constants for the whole population. We may 
therefore define the following functions:
a(X) = (27t)~p/2 [det(fl) V ln exp{ - }
b(y) = exp{- z" y'p'fl_1Py} and d(X) = P'fl"1X
Then g(x|y) can be expressed as a member of the exponential 
family of distributions(9) :
g(X|y)=a(X).b(y).exp[d'(X).y]
from which follows the sufficiency of d (X) =p' ft_1X. Under 
normality, E(y |X)=P'Z_1X = [ 1+p 1 Q-ip] _1 p'Q^x. In other
words, E(y|x) can be expressed as m.d(X) with m > 0, so that 
it is also a sufficient statistic for y.
The requirement that g(x|y) be a member of the 
exponential family for the sufficiency result to hold, is a 
much less restrictive condition than one would initially 
think. Assume X contains p variables. The exact condition 
for sufficiency only requires that p- 1 of the x's have 
distributions belonging to the exponential family. 
Furthermore, these distributions need not be the same. xi|y 
could follow a gamma distribution, while X2 |y could be 
normally distributed etc. Note also that the exponential 
family is broad enough to cover many of the commonly used 
distributions in empirical work, such as the normal, 
Poisson, and gamma distributions.
As an alternative to working with the multiple indicator 
index \|/, one could for instance use a weighted index of the 
indicators, by for example assigning equal weights to the 
x's:
£ = ( xi + X2 +. . .+ xp) / p
See Mood et al.(1974) for a discussion on the exponential family of 
distributions and the related sufficiency results.
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The weakness of an index such as based on arbitrary 
weights, is that generally it will not achieve the optimal 
reduction of the dimensionality of the problem ( from p to a 
unique dimension) in a way that no information about y is 
lost. Only a sufficient statistic will achieve this optimal 
reduction of the dimension of the data.
Finally, let us address the following question: when
should we be content with using a single variable xi, rather 
than working with the multiple indicator index? Assume we 
have estimated the factor analysis model (3.7), and we 
estimate Pi not to be significantly different from unity, 
and CDii not to be significantly different from zero. Under 
such circumstances, we could argue that x^ perfectly 
correlates with y, and thus that it is a suitable proxy for 
the unobservable.
1.6 Conclusions
The multiple indicator framework we have suggested is 
well suited to deal with a situation when a variable y 
pertinent to welfare analysis, is subject to measurement 
error. The index of y that we have proposed, is a linear 
function of the indicators X, and is defined as the 
regression function of y conditional upon X.
The multiple indicator index we have constructed from 
our data offered greater scope for agreement concerning the 
ranking of families with both consumption and income, than 
in the case where families were ranked using the latter two 
indicators. In this sense, the proposed method in this 
chapter can be seen as a compromise with respect to those 
who prefer to use consumption at the expense of income, and 
those who favour to work with income instead of the former.
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CHAPTER 2
The Allocation of Benefits Under Uncertainty 
2*1 Introduction
One reason why the identification of the poor is a 
question of interest, resides in the fact that it enables 
governments to assess the likely effects of adopting various 
welfare policies. Poverty alleviation policies may take the 
form of universal population coverage, or alternatively may 
be restricted to certain groups of individuals. The 
rationale underlying the targeting of benefits approach, 
lies in the need to ensure that those in need of state help 
obtain relief, and conversely, that resources are not wasted 
on raising the welfare of the already well-off members of 
society.
An important assumption underlying the targeting 
framework, is that needs of families are observable to the 
decision maker. As was pointed out in the last chapter, in 
taking a long term perspective of poverty, we are confronted 
with the problem that the life-cycle/permanent incomes of 
individuals are generally not observable. Instead, what we 
may observe are imperfect correlates of long run income. In 
this chapter we use the concepts discussed in chapter one, 
in order to examine the problem of allocating benefits to 
families in a situation of imperfect information.
Categorical benefits are often made available to 
specific socio-economic groups because there exists prior 
information concerning their risks of being poor. If for 
instance there exists a rural/urban bias in the 
participation to education and health programmes, the 
government.may wish to channel funds to inhabitants of rural 
areas, in an effort to correct the bias in the take-up of 
benefits. Old age and one-parent family benefits also exist 
because these two demographic groups are generally known to 
be more exposed to the risk of being in poverty. In the 
present chapter we investigate how information concerning
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the circumstances of families can be used in the decision 
to grant them state assistance. Rather than opting for a 
uni-dimensional classification related to socio-economic 
status (e.g. working versus jobless), we wish to use a set X 
of micro-data (income, expenditure, etc.) in order to 
decide whether a family should be granted assistance.
Assume that y is the variable underlying the welfare 
assessment of the family, and z is the corresponding poverty 
line. Poverty relief policies consist in raising y as 
closely as possible to z. Goodin(1985) points to the 
problem involved with specifying y :
"So too in social welfare policy is 'real need' an unobservable 
characteristic that correlates only imperfectly with standard 
indicators (income and wealth, family obligations and resources, 
etc.)"
For Besley and Coate(1992), y is defined as the "income- 
generating ability" of individuals. Initially Besley and 
Coate treat ability as an exogenous variable such as genetic 
endowment. At a later stage in their work, they let y be a 
function of the effort people put in acquiring skills, so 
that their ability variable approaches the concept of human 
capital. In this chapter, we will continue to define y as 
permanent income, as we have done in our previous chapter.
Assume y is the permanent income of the family and xi 
is its current income. One can write the following equation 
relating these two variables:
xi = y + v
where x> is transitory income. The question we dealt with in 
the previous chapter, was what could be learnt about y upon 
observing xi. We saw then that if we observed several 
indicators of y ,X=[xi,X2 , . . . ,xp] , we could hope to identify 
the conditional distribution of y when X is held fixed(1) . It 
is not necessary to go into this problem again , so that
See section 3 of chapter 1 .
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in this chapter we will take it that the distribution of y 
conditional upon X is known to the decision maker. That is, 
when the decision maker observes certain characteristics of 
the family, he can assess its probability of being in need.
Consider now the problem of deciding whether to grant 
assistance to a family with characteristics XQ. The decision 
maker could wrongly deny it assistance, when its income 
yQ falls short of the poverty line z. Likewise, he may 
decide the family qualifies for state support when in fact 
yQ>z. In order to derive the decision rule, it is necessary 
to make explicit the social costs of erring in either 
direction. It is for this reason that we believe a decision 
rule should be derived explicitly in relation to a family 
utility function (or a poverty measure), as well as in 
relation to the social opportunity costs entailed by 
poverty relief programmes. This will be the approach 
followed in the present chapter.
Two of the most studied limits on targeting are the 
consequences of imperfect information and the presence of 
claiming costs. Recognizing that identifying the poor may be 
problematic, Akerlof(1978) has suggested that individuals 
belonging to high poverty groups should "tagged" as poor 
for the purpose of public welfare policies. Our present 
analysis thus builds on Akerlof's work in that it models the 
probability that individuals with given characteristics face 
of being in poverty. Kanbur(1987) also examines the 
consequences of imperfect information for targeting. 
However, he assumes the existence only of knowledge on the 
poverty count of various population sub-groups, e.g. when 
say urban poverty is equal to 1 0 % and rural poverty is 2 0 %. 
Other researchers in the area have previously argued that 
the appropriate way to model the allocation of benefits 
under uncertainty would be to adopt a decision theoretic 
approach (for e.g. Goodin (1985), and Sen(1992)). The 
analysis presented in this chapter is a first attempt in 
formulating and implementing a decision-theoretic framework.
Another important contribution in the analysis of 
targeting under imperfect information, is the work of Besley
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and Coate (1992). They model the relationship between 
government and benefit claimants as a principal-agent model. 
The authors point out that the government wishes to deter 
the non-poor from applying for benefits, but also wishes to 
induce the poor in participating in welfare programmes. 
Besley and Coate suggest that "workfare" (i.e. work in order 
to qualify for state support) may be a powerful screening 
device in sorting out individuals with respect to their 
poverty status.
The decision problem considered in our work is limited 
to the case of granting a benefit of fixed size. Many 
categorical benefits in practice are of this nature. Child 
benefits and employment benefits in many countries operate 
in this fashion. In our work we do not take into account the 
incentive problems related to the take-up of benefits. 
Regarding this point, Besley(1990) writes:
"It may therefore be impossible to establish what a person would be 
able to earn were he or she not claiming benefits. This is a source of 
important incentive effects, since some individuals may choose to work 
less in order to qualify for benefits."
We also abstract from the costs of claiming benefits 
(Besley(1990)), and the more general problem of non-take-up 
by families who qualify for support. We also abstract from 
the consequences of redistributive costs associated with 
poverty relief programmes studied by Duclos(1992).
The plan of our chapter is the following. In section
2 . 2  we analyse the decision problem of granting benefits in 
a situation of perfect information. There we assume that y 
is observable to the decision maker, and we examine how 
changes in the poverty line, the size of the transfer, and 
the social opportunity cost of poverty relief policies, all 
affect the decision rule. In section 2.3 we analyse the 
decision problem in a situation of imperfect information. 
There we assume that y is unobserved, but the decision maker 
can draw evidence on the basis of a set of socio-economic 
characteristics of the family. In section 2.4 we give a
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specific example of how to construct the decision rule, and 
we illustrate the method with the help of the data we have 
used in our previous chapter. The observations from the 
Panel Study of Income dynamics use information on the 
incomes, food budget shares, and employment status of 910 
American families for the year 1986. Our summary section 
concludes the chapter.
2.2 Allocation of Benefits Under Full Information
Consider a society whose judgements regarding poverty 
are captured by an objective function W(u(yi, z)...,u(yn, z)), 
where W is increasing in yi if i is poor, and is non­
increasing otherwise. W is additively separable in the 
Ui' s. Let there be a benefit of fixed size I, (i.e. a lump­
sum transfer) available for poverty relief purposes. The 
decision maker has to decide to whom benefits should be 
granted in order to maximize post-transfer social welfare. 
The purpose of this section will be to analyse the problem 
of granting a lump-sum benefit to a family unit in a 
situation of perfect information. By perfect information we 
mean that needs or resources can be measured in a way that 
height and weight are, and that y is observable to the 
decision maker.
Assume that the utility function of a particular family 
takes the following form:
p(y, z) y<z
u(y,z) (2 .1)
k y>z
where p(.) is increasing and concave in y, and decreasing in 
z. We sketch the shape of the utility function below.
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k
z
FIGURE 2.1: Family utility function
The value k is entirely arbitrary, and in what follows we 
set k=0 .
The assumption that u(.) is non-increasing for y>z, is 
now common in the study of poverty (see Atkinson(1989) , 
ch. 2). It allows us to focus on the redistribution of 
resources to those below the poverty line. In that sense, it 
may seem a sensible specification in the context of poverty 
analysis. On the other hand, such a specification (and the 
associated objective of maximising the welfare of the poor) 
can be criticized on the grounds that it ignores the fact 
that redistribution to those nearing the poverty line may 
also be socially desirable. Atkinson (1993a) formulates his 
criticism concerning the "sharpness of objectives" on the 
grounds that:
“Such a 'sharp' representation of social objectives may not however be 
universally accepted. There may well be disagreement about the 
location of the poverty line. What one person may see as 'wasteful' 
expenditure on the non-poor, another may regard as contributing to the 
reduction of poverty....Alternatively, there may be agreement about 
the location of z, but concern for the 'near-poor', or the group above 
but close to the poverty line."
A social planner is considering granting a benefit of 
fixed size T to a family with resources y. Define X as the 
social opportunity cost of government spending on welfare
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programmes. If the family receives assistance, its 
contribution to post-transfer welfare as measured in social 
utility units is then :
B(y,x) = u(y+T,z) - X % (2 .2 )
The choices of u(.), z, and x, therefore reflect society's 
concern about poverty. Equation (2.2) is frequently chosen 
as the objective function in the economics of targeting. 
This formulation can be found for example in Kanbur 
(1987) and Duclos (1992), with the difference that here
we take the transfer to be of fixed size. Though it is
rarely mentioned, the formulation does away with incentive 
issues, in the sense that y is assumed not to be influenced 
by t(2) . The shadow price X  converts government spending
into social utility. It is therefore, the social opportunity 
cost of an extra dollar of government budget spent on 
poverty relief programmes.
If the family doesn't qualify for assistance, it
remains at its original welfare level u(y,z), and nothing is 
spent by the state. The social benefit arising from the
decision not to grant assistance is then :
B(y, 0) = u(y , z) (2.3)
The socially preferred decision rule is therefore
t = argmax [ B(y,x) ; B(y,0) ]
In words, if the social welfare gain arising from the
transfer outweighs its cost, the decision should be to grant 
support to the family:
AB(y,T)= B(y,X) - B(y,0) >0 <=> t=T (2.4)
In what follows AB(y,x) is defined as the net social benefit 
arising from the transfer.
Regarding this point, see Besley(1990) , and Besley and Coate(1992).
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Let us define yc as the value of y that equates B(y,x) 
to B(y,0). The critical (permanent) income yc/ is the income 
above which the social cost of the transfer exceeds the 
corresponding benefit. The critical value yc is defined via 
the following equality :
u(y+T,z) - u(y,z) = X t  
or, in more compact notation,
Au(y,T,z) = X x (2.5)
X  proxies the Lagrange multiplier on the government's budget 
constraint, and Au(y,x, z) is the welfare gain to the 
family induced by the transfer. Using the Implicit Function 
theorem , we can express yc as a function of X, x, and z.
yc = % ( X,X,z) (2.6)
y c is decreasing in X , meaning that fewer people may 
qualify for state assistance if the social opportunity cost 
of such programmes is on the increase. The critical income 
level is increasing in z, if the cross derivative of p(y,z) 
with respect to y and z is positive. For example, if p(y,z) 
is the utility function:
p(y,z)= - [z-y]a/a and a>l (2.7)
then yc is increasing in z when a>l, meaning that raising 
the level of the poverty line^ will allow more people to 
qualify for state support. On the other hand, if for example 
we follow Watts (1968) in specifying p(y,z)=log(y/z) , the 
cross derivative of p(y,z) will be null. In the case of the 
Watts measure, the critical income yc will be independent 
of where we choose to set the poverty line.
Finally, we note that increases in x, the size of the 
government transfer, will go in the direction of reducing 
the critical income yc . This is because at yc, the marginal
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social benefit arising from the transfer, uMyc+T/Z), is 
lower than X , the corresponding marginal social cost. We 
illustrate this point with the help of the diagram drawn in 
figure 2 . 2 below.
u (,)
yc+Tyc
FIGURE 2.2: Government transfers and the critical income
Given equation (2.5), the difference between pre-transfer 
and post-transfer utility levels at yc must be X x . The slope 
of the dashed line joining u(yc,z) to u(yc+T,z) is therefore 
X x  / x = X . Because the marginal utility of income is a 
decreasing function, from the Mean Value Theorem we know 
that there exists an income level ym such that u'(ym,z)=X, 
and yc <ym <yc+ »^ The concavity of u(,) in y implies that 
u'(ym , z )>u'(yc+T , z ) , so that X > u  'y (yc+x, z) . Thus, yc is a 
decreasing function of x. In other words, if the state 
wishes to be more generous in terms of the support it grants 
to families, the resulting effect will be a reduction in the 
extent of population coverage*3* .
Let us illustrate these results with the help of the 
function p(y,z)of (2.7). Consider a family with income y=z-e, 
where £>0. For the family to qualify for assistance, it must 
be that:
u(z - 8 + T, z) - u(z - e, z) > X x
For a proof of the above statements see the appendix.
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Given the function p(y,z) of (2.7), the first term of the 
left hand side of the inequality cancels out to zero when £< 
X. Conditional on certain parameter restrictions we can 
therefore explicitly solve for £ as follows:
[e]a/a > X x
The family qualifies for benefits when
X> £ > [aXx]1/a (2.9)
A necessary condition for (2.9) to hold is that
X > [aX]1'*-1 (2.10)
That is, conditional on (2.9), we can express the critical 
income as being
yc = z- [aXx]1/a
A family with income y then qualifies for state support if 
y < yc. Increases in z will therefore raise the critical 
income yc. Also, in the neighborhood of (2.9), increases in X 
and X will induce a reduction in the value of the critical 
income.
2.3 Consequences of Imperfect Information
Allocating benefits when uncertainty prevails about 
who the poor are, raises more complications. The problem can 
be (unfairly) summarized by noting that two types of errors 
may occur in the decision making process. When a poor person 
is denied a benefit (t=0) a type I error occurs. When a 
non-poor is granted assistance, a type II error results. 
Many economists (presumably) believing that type II errors 
occur too often in practice, have suggested that benefits 
should only be restricted to certain groups. The motivation 
behind efficient targeting was to avoid the extensive 
wastage originating from type II errors.
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decision state of nature
poor non-poor
on4-) type-I error 0
t=T - type-II error
TABLE 2.1: Decisions under uncertainty, types I and II errors
For instance see the work of Glewwe (1990). Others, such as 
Atkinson (1993a) and Sen (1992), have expressed scepticism 
with regards to targeting and the concept of efficiency 
underlying it. Note that in a decision theoretic framework, 
the argument for universal benefits can be made on the 
basis that welfare costs of type I errors may be very high, 
despite the fact that type II errors are more frequent(4) .
The difference between the present decision problem and 
that of the full information case lies in the fact that y 
is not observed by the decision maker. The social benefit 
that results from a transfer to a person is thus a random 
variable. When y > z, the benefit is zero since the 
applicant is non-poor. Estimating the distribution of y 
when X is held fixed, is then the key element of an 
expected utility maximizing decision maker. His cost 
/benefit exercise of granting assistance to an applicant 
will be carried out by means of the comparison of the 
social cost , and the expected value of the social benefit 
of the transfer.
In analysing the decision problem under uncertainty we 
assume that y is not observed, but that it is related to a 
set X of observed indicators through the following 
relation:
For a brief introduction to statistical decision theory, see Barnett(1982) 
ch.7 .
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y=a' X + e (3.1)
Define 8 as the set of structural parameters relating the 
random variable y to the random vector X and the error term 
e. In a first stage we will assume that the distribution of 
y conditional upon X, h(y|X;8 ), is known to the decision 
maker, though y is not observed. In sub-section 2.3A below, 
we extend the discussion of the previous section to analyse 
the decision making process when y is unobserved, but when 
h(y|X;8 ) is known . Then in sub-section 2.3B, we draw on the 
results of our previous chapter, in order to carry the 
discussion through to the case when the conditional 
distribution of y upon X is unknown.
2.3A h(ylX;8) is known
If y is not observable to the decision maker, it is 
legitimate to question how the conditional distribution 
h(y|X;8 ) may be known. Glewwe(1990) suggests that h(y|X;8 ) 
may be inferred on the basis of household surveys, provided 
these constitute a source of accurate information:
"First, the income (or expenditure) data must be accurate, otherwise 
it will introduce a source of error and make it difficult to judge the 
accuracy of targeting".
Typically, due to the way the tax/benefit system operates, 
the government cannot ascertain the exact income of a 
family. Nonetheless, it possesses more accurate knowledge 
about the overall distribution of income. In the framework 
of Glewwe, y is a variable which is measurable in money 
terms, so that his assumption that consumer surveys provide 
information on y becomes a valid one(5) . The reader may then 
wish to inquire as to why the decision maker cannot observe 
y, while this information is known to the benefit applicant.
 ^^  When y is permanent income, as we choose to define it in our work, the 
measurement error problem is bound to remain in surveys based on cross- 
section type sampling.
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Glewwe1s explanation is an account of the often discussed 
adverse selection problem related to the take-up of 
benefits:
"Given that both governments and non-governmental organizations have 
limited resources, it is important that assistance is not mistakenly 
given to the non-poor, who may attempt to gain access to benefits by 
misrepresenting their income status."
When h(y|X;8 ) is known but y is unobserved, the net 
social benefit arising from the transfer also becomes a 
random variable:
-A/c if the family is non-poor 
AB(y,x) = (3.2)
Au(y,x, z) -A/c otherwise
The problem of allocating benefits under uncertainty is then 
one of choosing a decision rule t (X) , so as to maximize 
social welfare.
decision state of nature
poor non-poor
t=0 0 0
t=T Au (y,x, z) -Ax -Ax
TABLE 2.2: States of nature, decisions, and social payoffs
The net benefit arising from the transfer, from society's 
point of view, therefore depends on the decision t(X). Since 
the expected net social benefit under t= 0 is null, a 
consistent decision rule with respect to expected utility 
maximization is to grant the applicant assistance if the 
expected value of the net social benefit from the transfer 
is positive.
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Example
Let us illustrate the above ideas by means of an 
example. Assume the utility function takes the form:
The state is considering granting an infinitesimal transfer 
of size X to families. A family should then qualify for 
state assistance if the expected marginal benefit from the 
transfer outweighs the marginal cost, i.e. if :
Furthermore, assume y=x+£, where 8 is an error term with a 
normal N(0,CD) distribution. The decision maker observes x 
but not y. Then,
Prob[y < z-x] = prob[e < v(x)3 with v = z-x-x.
Likewise, -c[z-y-x] = -c[v(x)-£] so that
-c[z-y] y<z
u (y, z)
0 y>z
[ z - y - x ] f (y) dy > X
[ z - y - x ] f (y) dy [v(x) - 8] f (8) d£
and from Leibniz' rule, it follows that
[v(x) - 8] f (8) de de
f(e) de
Upon integrating, we get
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[ v - e ] f(e) de = v f (v ) - v  f (v) - | F (e) d(e)
■oo
so that -c [v (x) - e] f (e) de = c f (v ) .
A family is therefore granted a benefit if c F(z-x-x) > X .  
Assume that c = 2\. We would then grant assistance to all 
families who have endowments x such that x + x < z.
Let E(Ab ) denote the expected net benefit from the 
transfer. The expected benefit criterion is defined as 
follows:
Now consider a family which is just at the margin of 
qualifying for state support when the poverty line is zQ, 
the size of the benefit equals %Q, and the social 
opportunity cost of government transfers is X 0 . For this 
family E(Ab)=0, s o  that
Differentiating (3.3) at the critical value E(Ab)=0, we find 
that increases in X  and X will reduce the expected value of 
the social benefit arising from the transfer. These points 
are illustrated in figure 2.3, and derived in the appendix 
of the chapter.
E (Ab) = E[Au(y,T,z)] - X x (3.3)
E (u (y+xQ, zQ) ] = E [u (y, zQ) ] + X0x0 (3.4)
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X'T
Aot
E(AB)=0
To
FIGURE 2.3: Changes in the social opportunity cost of poverty relief
policies
Increases in X  will shift the line A,0t upward to X ’T, so that 
E(Ab) falls. If T is increased beyond z0r the expected 
benefit from the transfer increases less rapidly than the 
corresponding social cost, resulting in a decrease in E(Ab). 
Finally, the expected benefit from the transfer is 
increasing in z when the cross derivative of u(,) is 
positive (and conversely when the cross-derivative is 
negative). These results echo the findings of the full 
information set-up.
2.3B h(ylX;8) is unknown
If we believe that the state should give assistance to 
families in need, for all practical purposes we have to be 
able to define the concept of needs. Many economists are 
aware of the problems involved in assessing needs and 
living standards. Income and consumption with their many 
limitations have been frequently chosen as the variables 
forming the basis of judgement with regards to needs. 
Chaudhuri and Ravallion (19 92) have argued that annual 
incomes were subject to substantial variability, and that 
many households that were not poor for a particular year, 
had little chance of escaping poverty in the long run. If we 
were to adopt long term income as the criterion for 
assessing needs, we must recognize that cross-section data
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cannot provide direct information on permanent income(6) . It
is therefore worth inquiring what can be inferred about y,
when we observe cross-section data X such as income and 
consumption, but y is not observed.
We saw in the previous chapter that under certain 
conditions(7) , if we postulated a factor analysis model 
between X and y ;
X = |3y + u (3.3)
we could estimate the vector 8 of structural parameters of
the model (3.3). The set 8 contains the vector p, and the 
covariance matrix £2 of the error vector U.
One of the ingredients of expected utility analysis is 
the subjective probabilities that a decision maker attaches 
to the occurrence of particular events. If the relevant 
variable is continuous, these beliefs will be defined via a 
continuous probability distribution. If we postulate that X 
and y have a joint probability distribution g(X,y;8 ), then 
it follows from Bayes' rule that
h(y|X;8 ) = g(X,y;8 )/ J g(X,y;8 )dy
Therefore, equipped with consistent estimators of 8 , we can 
estimate the distribution of y conditional upon X. The 
estimator of 8 , we note, is derived without observations on 
y, and is distribution-free. The choice of the parametric 
relation between X and y is on the other hand arbitrary, and 
normality is often chosen for convenience purposes. Prior 
knowledge on the distribution of life-time incomes is to say 
the least, scarce. Nonetheless, there exist human capital 
theories of life-cycle earnings, which may prove useful as a 
starting point in elaborating on the distribution of
Panel data , as we saw in our previous chapter, can also be used to
predict permanent income. However, one cannot expect a welfare officer to
turn down young benefit applicants, because say, they have only worked for one
year, and that a unique observation does not provide sufficient information
about long term income.
(7) These are essentially statistical identification conditions.
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permanent incomes. (See Weiss (1985) for a survey on the 
determinants of life cycle earnings.)
2.4 An example
In this section we construct an example to illustrate 
the problem of allocating benefits under uncertainty. We 
then use the data analyzed in the previous chapter, to 
examine how changes in the poverty line z, the size of the 
transfer x, and the social opportunity cost of poverty 
alleviation X, affect the number of families which may 
qualify for benefits. In a first stage, we develop the 
expected net social benefit criterion using a specific 
utility function. This task will be undertaken in sub­
section 2.4A. In the second sub-section, we analyze the 
characteristics of the families which qualify for state 
support, using the decision rule derived in sub-section 
2.4A.
2.4A Specification of the Expected Net Social Benefit 
Function.
Our starting point is to specify a form for the utility 
function (2.1). In section 2.2, we stated that the function
satisfied the requirements that
ul)- u is non-increasing in z and non-decreasing in y. 
u2 )- for y<z u(.) is increasing and concave in y.
u3)- for y>z u is constant in y.
u4)- The cross-derivative of u is non-negative.
Under conditions ul-u4, we established that the critical 
income level yc, and the expected net benefit from the
transfer, E(Ab ), were decreasing in Xandx, and increasing
in z. We therefore retain the utility function (4.1), where 
we set a=2 .
a>l and y<z
(4.1)
0 y>z
The decision maker grants a benefit to the family if 
the expected social benefit from the transfer outweighs its 
cost, i.e. if
*Z-X
E(Ab) = I u(y+x,z) h(y|x,8 )dy -I
f
u(y,z) h(y|x,S)dy > Xz (4.2)
Let |i(x) and a respectively denote the expected value, and 
standard deviation, of the distribution of y when X is held 
fixed. Define the random variable r\ as follows:
T| = [y - Jl(x)]/ <T (4.3)
Then, T| has zero mean and unit variance. Likewise, define 
the following variables:
w=[z - x - ii(x)]/ o and, (4.4a)
v=[z - |i(x)]/ o (4.4b)
It follows from the definitions of w and v that
Prob (y<z) =Prob (T|<v) and 
Prob ((y+x<z) =Prob (T|<w)
Also, we have from (4.4a) that (z-y)= a(v-T|) , so that 
for y<z, u(y,z)= - <J2(v-T|)2/2 (4.5)
Thus substituting (4.5) into (4.2), we obtain the 
following expression for the expected net social benefit 
criterion:
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e (Ab ) =
2
L
(v-r|r h (r\) dr| - I (w-rir h(r|)dTi - Ax (4.6)
What remains for us to do in order to complete the task of 
specifying the expected benefit function, is to choose a 
parametric form for the joint distribution of X and y. In 
section 1.3 of our previous chapter, we saw that under the 
joint normality assumption, the distribution of y|x was also 
normal with mean :
tl(x)= (3' (PP1 +Q)~l X ; (4.7a)
and variance G2 ={1- p' (pp' + £2)-1 p} (4.7b)
so that from (4.3),
t| =[y - P'(PP'+Q)'1 x]/{l- P' (PP- +Q)-1 P)1/2 (4.8)
and, h(Tl) = (2lt) "1/2 . exp (-T|2/2) (4.9)
Substituting (4.8) and (4.9) into (4.6) completes the 
specification of the expected benefit function, as well as 
the decision rule. If E(Ab )>0 the decision rule dictates 
that a family ought to be granted assistance. In the sub­
section below , we report some results on the decision to 
grant state support to families when z, A, and x, are 
allowed to vary.
2. 4B Results
We are here making use of the data we have looked at 
in our previous chapter. For the year 1986, we have 
information on 910 families from the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics, from which we draw evidence from the following 
variables:
xi : family income to needs ratio.
x2 : food expenditure/total taxable income of head
and wife.
X3 : total annual employment hours of head/ total
annual employment+unemployment hours of head.
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From the results reported in table 1.2 of chapter 1, 
and under the general normality assumption, we can derive 
the following conditional distribution for y:
y|x ~ N ( 0.36xi -0.41x2 +0.23x3 ; 0.513)
In our first application, we set the poverty line z at a 
level such that 10% of the population is expected to be 
poor. By this, we mean that the inequality 0.3 6xi -0.41x2 
+ 0 .2 3 x 3 < z, holds for 10% of the families included in our
sample.
7t=10% T=0 . 1
CNOII
h= 0.5 70 66
1=1 31 28
1=1.5 16 14
Table 2.3: Allocation of benefits for a poverty head-count of 10%
Table 2.3 above reports the number of families which ought 
to be granted benefits for various values of X  and T. Since 
the income to needs ratio (xi) is equal to unity for a 
family who is at the U.S. official poverty line, we can 
interpret T as being a lump-sum transfer adjusted for family 
size. Under this interpretation, a value 1=0.1 is taken to 
signify a transfer amounting to 10% of the family's 
"official" needs. When X = l ,  we are in a situation whereby a 
dollar spent on poverty, alleviation has a social cost of 
unity. On the other hand, when X,= 1.5, one dollar spent on 
poverty alleviation is equivalent, in social accounting 
units , to a reduction of spending on alternative government 
programmes by 1.5 dollars, etc.
The findings are in conformity with what follows from 
the discussion of sections 2.2 and 2.3. Increase in X  and T 
reduce the number of families which may be granted the
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benefit. For instance, at t=0.1 and A,=0.5, 70 families
qualify for state support, and 6 6 families when the size of 
the transfer is doubled and X remains fixed at 0.5. At the 
other end, for X=1.5, these figures drop to 16 and 14 
families respectively.
Let us for now examine the 14 most deprived families. 
These are the ones that qualify for state help when A,= 1.5 
and x=0.2. Below we refer to this sub-sample as S14, and to 
the entire sample as S910. If for a particular family in 
1986, the family head has not been unemployed, the family 
spends less than one third of its income on food, and its
income is at least as high as its needs, we will refer to
the family as being in acceptable economic conditions. If 
the family violates n out of the three conditions, we will 
say that it is poor on n indicators. For instance, if the 
family spends half of its income on food, the head is never
out of a job, and the family crosses the poverty line in the
income space, according to this multiple deprivations 
exercise, the family is poor on the basis of one indicator. 
The main features of sub-sample S14 are summarized below:
-One family is poor on the basis of one indicator, 11 
on the basis of 2 indicators, and two on the basis of all 
three indicators. Thus, none of these fourteen families is 
living in acceptable economic conditions.
-Only three family heads did not experience 
unemployment spells. Only one family spends less than a 
third of its income on food. Five out of these families are 
income poor ( there are seven income poor families in the 
entire sample).
-The average family in this sub-sample has 0.17 times 
the average income of the entire sample. For S14, the food 
budget share is 10 times the average for S910, and the 
employment ratio is half that of the corresponding S910 
average.
In table 2.4 we repeat the above exercise, with the 
difference that we raise the poverty line, to obtain a 
poverty head-count equal to 20%. Because we chose a utility 
function with a non-negative cross derivative with respect
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to y and z, we established that the critical value yc/ ( and 
thus the number of families which qualify for assistance) 
was non-decreasing in z. This is why, in table 2.4, when the 
poverty line is raised, the number of families which qualify 
for benefits are never fewer. The degree of coverage varies 
from 8 6 families for A,=0.5 and 1=0.1, to 16 families for 
X=1.5. These figures all increase, with the exception of 
the case where A,= 1.5 and T=0.1. There , the number remains 
at 16 families. We now summarize the characteristics of the 
33 families which qualify for support when X=1 and 1=0.1. We 
denote this sub-sample as S33.
71=20% T=0 .1 x=0.2
X=0.5
X=1
X=1.5
86 80 
31 28 
16 14
Table 2.4: Allocation of benefits for a poverty head-count of 20%
-Six out of the 33 family heads did not experience 
unemployment spells.
-Six families have a food budget share lower than 1/3.
-All seven income poor families of the entire sample 
S910, are present in the sub-sample.
-Three families are poor on the basis of all three 
indicators. Twenty are poor on two out of the three 
indicators, and 8 are poor on only one indicator. None of 
these families are therefore living in acceptable economic 
conditions.
-For S33, the average income is a quarter of 
the average income of the entire sample. The food budget 
share is 6 times the average for S910, and the employment 
ratio is a fraction 0.57 of the corresponding S910 average.
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It should be noted that the framework we have 
suggested for the allocation of benefits under uncertainty 
is compatible with a situation where the optimal poverty 
alleviation policy is to extend coverage to the entire 
population. It follows from our discussion that this 
scenario is more likely the higher the poverty line is, and 
the lower the size of the benefit and social opportunity 
costs of government transfers are.
7t=25% 1=0.01 T=0 .02
X=0.01 
k=0 .02
892 892 
875 875
Table 2.5: Approaching universal population coverage
In table 2.5 we consider various values of X and x which 
would nearly entail universal population coverage when the 
poverty head-count is 25%. Since the sample consists of 910 
families, we note for instance that for a benefit size of
0 .0 1 , a value 0 . 0 1  for X ensures that 98% of sample families 
qualify for state assistance.
To summarize our findings, we compare S14, S33, and the 
sample S910 of 910 families. In the table below, "o" refers 
to the families which are in acceptable economic conditions, 
z denotes families which are poor on one indicator, zz for 
those who are poor on the basis of two indicators etc. 
Finally, the last three columns contain the means of the 
three indicators, expressed as ratios with respect to the 
corresponding averages for the entire sample of 910 
families.
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Sample
Si
O z zz zzz mean of 
* 1
mean of
x2
mean of 
*3
S14 0 1 11 2 0.17 10.11 0 .53
S 3 3 0 8 22 3 0.23 6.03 0 .57
s 910 717 155 35 3 1 1 1
Table 2.6: Characteristics of recipients for various degrees of
coverage
The last line is of interest since it defines the 
characteristics of recipients in a situation where the 
government introduces a universal benefit system. Let us 
compare this bench-mark assumption with the case where 
coverage is restricted to 14 families. The families of S14 
have the lowest average income endowments, 1 0 times the 
average food budget share, and half the employment ratio of 
the average family head of S910. When the parameters of the 
economy are altered so as to increase coverage to 33 
families, the sample S33 is less poorly endowed than S14, 
but still significantly worse off than the sample S910. We 
can summarize our findings by stating that as we move from 
restricted coverage towards a universal benefit system, the 
pool of recipients reveal on average better income 
endowments , more favourable employment ratios , and lower 
food budget shares. In this sense, we feel that the 
framework suggested for the allocation of benefits in a 
situation of uncertainty, seems adequate.
2.5 Summary
The purpose of this chapter was to analyze the problem 
of benefit allocation in a situation of imperfect 
information. We have suggested the use of socio-economic 
indicators as a means of assessing the probability that a 
family is in poverty. The decision rule then derived 
consisted in granting state assistance to a family if the 
expected value of the social benefit from the transfer 
outweighed the corresponding cost. This rule arose from a
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cost-benefit analysis problem in an environment of 
uncertainty. Alternatively, it can be viewed as the 
solution to a problem in statistical decision theory.
In order to keep the framework tractable at the 
empirical level, we have made some important omissions. 
Incentive issues, the problem of take-up, and redistributive 
costs, have all been discarded from the analysis. In order 
to improve in the direction of making our work relevant to a 
real world situation, the various omitted factors need to be 
accounted for in the cost/benefit exercise of granting state 
assistance.
2. A Appendix
In this appendix we prove two propositions. The first 
of these pertains to the critical income yc (section 2 .2 ), 
and the second, to the expected benefit criterion (section 
2.3) .
P r o p o s i t i o n  1 :  The critical income yc is a decreasing 
function of X  and T. It is an increasing function of z if 
u ”yz (y, z) > 0 , decreasing if u”yz(y,z) < 0, and independent 
of z if u nyz(y,z) = 0.
Sufficient conditions for the use of the implicit 
functions theorem are given in Chiang (1984) p. 206. In the 
context of our work, they can be stated as follows:
(i) at a point ( yc, z 0 , X 0 ,z0 ) satisfying the condition
ufyc+'Co ,zc) - u(yc ,zG) = X 0z 0 (a.l)
Ab has continuous partial derivatives with respect to y , z , X ,  
and T.
(ii) At the point (yc, z 0 , X 0 ,z0 ) , the partial derivative 
of Ab with respect to y is different from zero.
Condition (i) is always satisfied provided yc < z. From 
(a.l) it follows that yc < z, since if yc > z it must be that 
A b = - X z  *  0.
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Differentiating Ab with respect to y at (yc, zQ , X ol x Q ) , 
we have
AB'y = u'y(yc+x0 /zG) - u'y(yc/z0) < 0
since yc < z. Condition (ii) is therefore satisfied. There 
thus exists a neighborhood of (yc/ z 0 , X 0 , x 0 ) where the 
implicit function yc = § ( X tx fz) is defined.
Totally differentiating (a.l) holding z and X constant, 
we have
[ u'y(yc+T , z ) - u ' y  (yc, z ) ] dyc = x dX 
yc is therefore decreasing in X  . Likewise,
[ u'y(yc+T0 /Z ) - u'y(yc,z ) ] dyc = [X 0-  u ' x (yc+T0 , z )]
dx
From the Mean Value Theorem there exists ym such that 
u'y(ym,z )=A,0, and yc <ym <yc+To- The concavity of u(,) in y 
implies that u'y(ym ,z )>u'y(yc+Xo ,z ), so that Xo>u'y(yc+X0, z) 
(see figure 2.2). It follows that yc is also decreasing in x.
Totally differentiating (a.l) holding X  and X constant, 
we have
[u 'y (yc+X, z) - u'y(yc,z) ]dyc + [u’z(yc+x,z) - u'z(yc,z ) ] dz =0
The second bracketed expression is positive when u"yz >0. 
Thus dyc/dz > 0 if u"yz>0, etc.
P r o p o s i t i o n  2 :  At E(Ab)=0, the expected value of the net 
social benefit from the transfer is a decreasing function of 
X  and r. It is increasing in z if u"yz(y,z) > 0, and 
decreasing if unyz(y,z) < 0.
At the critical value E(Ab )=0, the following equality 
holds:
E[u(y+X0 ,zQ)]- E[u (y, zQ) ] = X 0x 0 (a. 2)
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Differentiating E(AB) with respect to z,X, and X, we have: 
E(AB'z)= E[u'z(y+X0, z) - u ' z (y, z )]>0 if u"yz(y,z) >0 , etc.
E ( A B ' x )= -To < 0 
also, e(Ab'x)= E [u't(y+x0, z) ] - X Q
From the Mean Value Theorem, there exists xm such that 
E[u'x(y +xm , z )]= X 0 and 0<xm<xo . The concavity of u(,) in y 
implies that E[u'T(y +xQ , z )]< Xq (see figure 2.3). Therefore, 
at the critical value E ( A b )=0, increases in x will reduce 
the expected value of the net social benefit arising from 
the transfer.
CHAPTER 3
Poverty and the Economics of Information 
3*1 Introduction
Chapters one and two have discussed questions related 
to the identification and allocation of benefits to the 
poor. This chapter differs from the previous two in the 
sense that the discussion is centred around examining 
specific economic mechanisms which cause poverty to arise, 
as opposed to treating deprivation as a given, or exogenous, 
phenomenon.
The Public Finance literature is rich with examples in 
which the market allocation of resources is not Pareto 
efficient. Missing markets, imperfect information, 
rationing, and other obstacles to trade, will typically 
result in a negation of the optimality property of the 
competitive equilibrium. Less work though has been done in 
the direction of assessing the impact of market 
imperfections on the incidence of poverty. An often 
discussed example in the area, is the degree to which 
information asymmetries in the credit market distort the 
allocation of investment from the social optimum. In this 
chapter we wish to extend the discussion in the direction 
of examining the likely effects of credit market 
imperfections on the level of poverty. One aim of the work 
is to show that credit market imperfections need not have an 
adverse effect on the level of poverty. Furthermore, we wish 
to explain how an economy operating subject to an imperfect 
credit market, may attain a lower level of poverty than 
would be the case in absence of these market imperfections.
For the purpose of our inquiry we are considering a 
dual economy, consisting of an advanced sector, and a 
subsistence one. Corresponding to the two sectors, there 
exist two occupations that individuals can choose between. 
The first occupation, advanced sector employment, requires 
the acquisition of a high level of skills, a typical
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example of which may be taken as a university degree. There 
are tuition fees so that for some individuals this option 
necessitates borrowing capital from the credit market. The 
alternative occupation does not require investments in human 
capital, and thus enables individuals to save on the fixed 
costs associated with entering the advanced sector, as well 
as the possible complications involved with borrowing. There 
is an information asymmetry in the credit market: borrowers 
have different levels of expected returns from education, 
and hence different probabilities of defaulting on their 
loans. While the distribution of returns is public 
information, banks cannot distinguish borrowers who are 
likely to default on the repayment of their loans from those 
who are not likely to.
We consider two concepts of poverty. Using an income 
concept, we set the poverty line at the payoff of the 
subsistence occupation. As defined by the classical 
economists, subsistence income is taken as the minimum 
income required in order to survive, or "subsist". The 
second concept we retain is one based on the human capital 
endowments of individuals. Schultz (1993), p.2 writes:
"Where there is little human capital there is only hard manual work 
and poverty, except for those who have some income from property."
Individuals working in the subsistence occupation have low 
levels of education , and accordingly can be defined as 
poor on the basis of a human capital life-cycle theory of 
earnings. We shall be using the head-count measure in order 
to quantify the level of poverty. For instance, using the 
income concept, the level of poverty is taken to be the 
fraction of the population earning subsistence income.
With these definitions in mind, we state the two 
objectives of the chapter. Our first purpose is to examine 
the extent to which credit market imperfections can be a 
cause of poverty. In order to investigate this question, we 
contrast the amounts of poverty our model would account for 
in a regime of full information and one of asymmetric
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information. The second purpose of this work is to assess
the potential for government intervention in the direction
of poverty reduction. We show that depending on the demand 
for workers with higher education, the presence of
information asymmetries may reduce, or have a neutral 
effect on the incidence of poverty. Also, we find that in 
general the social objectives of reducing poverty and 
maximizing total surplus have to be traded off against 
one another. We conclude our work by stressing the
importance of examining the likely effects of efficiency 
enhancing policies on the incidence of poverty.
The model we examine below is closely related to the 
work of Mankiw (1986), and Bernanke and Gertler (1990). The 
three models have in common the adverse selection problem in 
the credit market, with respect to the default probabilities 
of borrowers. The major difference between our work and the 
previous two, is the emphasis placed on poverty reduction as 
opposed to the more frequently discussed efficiency 
objectives. The work of Starrett (197 6 ) also attempts to 
establish a relationship between information problems and 
the occurrence of poverty. He constructs a model where 
"Economic agents somehow adopt the wrong model of the world, 
and their beliefs become self-reinforcing ." In such models 
poverty is endogenous to the system in the sense that
"... an individual who is poor (or black , disadvantaged etc, ) may 
perceive his chances for success as small, and therefore not apply 
himself very much; he winds up a failure and appears to reinforce the 
view that his peer group is at a disadvantage even though the system 
is perfectly fair."
In Starrett's work poverty thus arises as a rational 
expectations equilibrium. Though uncertainty is common to 
our work and that of Starrett's, it is asymmetric 
information which drives our analysis, as opposed to the 
distorted beliefs leading agents to " adopt the wrong model 
of the world". Barham et al. (1992) study the relationship
between education and poverty. However, their work centres
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on the theme of funding education through family channels 
exclusively, and rules out the possibility of borrowing 
through the credit market . As such, their theory is closer 
in essence to the work of Becker and Tomes (1986). Galor and 
Zeira (1993) also examine the allocation of credit in an 
economy with information asymmetries. Their purpose is to 
examine the long run evolution of the distribution of wealth 
and its impact upon long-run growth. They offer an analysis 
of a moving picture, close in spirit to the literature on 
growth theory. Other models similar to that of Galor and 
Zeira include Piketty (1992), Aghion and Bolton (1991), and 
Banerjee and Newman (1991).
Our chapter is structured as follows. In section 3.2 we 
present the framework we shall be using in order to explore 
the relationship between poverty and information problems. 
In section 3.3 we examine the equilibrium of the economy 
under a regime of full information. In section 3.4 we model 
the economy in presence of information asymmetries. In 
section 3.5 we contrast the amounts of poverty that result 
from both information regimes. In section 3.6 we examine the 
scope of government intervention for poverty reduction 
purposes. We conclude the chapter in section 3.7.
3.2 A Framework
We consider an economy with two sectors: a subsistence 
sector and an advanced one. The advanced sector is 
characterized by profit maximization, so that labour is 
hired up to the point where its marginal product equals the 
market wage. Meier(1984) p.162, defines the subsistence 
sector as being:
"... that part of the economy which does not use reproducible capital 
and does not hire labor for profit-the indigenous traditional sector 
or the self-employment sector."
In order to be able to enter the advanced sector, agents 
have to make an investment in human capital during the first 
period of their life, which would allow them to earn
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advanced sector wages w in the next period. This investment 
is associated with a risk factor, in the sense that each 
individual faces a specific probability 1 -p of not being 
successful in his training. As an alternative to investing 
in human capital, an agent may choose to enter directly the 
subsistence sector in the beginning of the first period, 
and earn a wage c in each of the two periods. These 
occupational choices and their respective remunerations are 
drawn below.
2c
subsistence occupation
investment in human capital
1-P
time
0 1 2  
FIGURE 3.1: Remunerations from the alternative occupations
There exists a credit market for the purpose of 
financing education. The loan will typically cover tuition 
fees. The loan can also be viewed as comprising a living 
allowance b<c, in addition to the tuition expenses. If 
education contains consumption good aspects, than b can 
also be interpreted as the the non-monetary benefits of 
education. Following either of these interpretations, we can 
normalize the size of the loan at unity. The credit market 
is operating under a competitive regime , so that banks are 
willing to lend to potential students as the long as the 
expected rate of return on the loans equals the risk-free 
interest rate. The risk-free interest rate is exogenous and 
is set equal to zero, so that the supply of credit becomes 
driven by a zero-profit condition. That is, banks are 
willing to offer loans to students at an interest rate which 
allows them to break even.
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Individuals in the economy differ in two respects: 
whether or not they have to use the credit market in order 
to fund their education, and their expected returns from the 
high skills occupation. For the purpose of our model , we 
distinguish three categories of individuals: F, NH, and NL. 
The proportions of individuals in each of the three
categories is given in the table below.
individual F NH NL
proportion * (l-Ml-X)
Table 3.1: Categories of agents, and their respective proportions
Funded individuals (F) are those who do not require to use 
the credit market. Their funds can come from subsidized 
credit, bequests, or family funds available for the
childrens' education^1* . To simplify the model, we assume 
that banks do not hand out cash to students, but rather pay 
the tuition and other fees directly to the school/college 
etc. This is a reasonable assumption since it can only 
reduce the riskiness of lending from the banks' point of 
view. We will also restrict ourselves to the situation 
whereby F-type agents are the ones who have no incentive 
whatsoever to use the credit market. This is the main
feature which distinguishes them from the other two groups 
of individuals.
Individuals who require the use of the credit market 
are non-funded and come in two types: NH and NL. NH has a 
high success probability pH in his human capital investment, 
whereas NL has a lower success probability pL. Since in the 
adverse state, workers only earn subsistence income from 
their study, they are obliged to default on their loan.
Thus, the success probability of borrowers matters to the 
bank since it is also the probability of returning the
Regarding the question of family funding of education, see Becker and 
Tomes (1986), and Barham et al. (1992).
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loan. When the borrower's type is not observable to the 
bank, an adverse selection problem occurs in the credit 
market.
The demand for skilled workers is a function LD(w,q), 
where q is a shift parameter. The market wage is thus an 
endogenous variable. The borrowing price r, of the tuition 
fees is also an endogenous variable. It is determined by 
the supply and demand for credit. The model thus aims at 
explaining the market wage w , the terms of borrowing r, 
and the fraction of individuals who choose to acquire 
education. From the model we can deduce the share of 
individuals who are in poverty in terms of life-cycle 
income or human capital.
3.3 The Full Information Economy
Since we intend to examine the consequences of 
asymmetric information on the incidence of poverty, it is 
important to know what kind of equilibrium the economy 
achieves under a situation of full information. We therefore 
begin our discussion in the hypothetical case in which banks 
can observe the default probabilities of borrowers. 
Throughout our work we assume that individuals are risk 
neutral, so that utility levels can be expressed as linear 
functions of the returns arising from the various 
occupations.
Consider first NH and NL. They are those who have to 
use the credit market in order to finance their studies. NL 
has the low success and repayment probability pL. His 
expected return from education is b+pL (w-rL) + (l-pL) c, where 
rL is the repayment requested by the bank in exchange for 
covering NL' s tuition fees. If he chooses the subsistence 
occupation, he can work as an unskilled worker and earn the 
cumulated wage 2c. He thus chooses to study if b+pL (w-rL) + (1- 
pL)c > 2c. Since the credit market is operating under a 
zero-profit condition, the bank will set rL=l/pL. The 
reservation wage of NL (the minimum wage that induces NL to 
acquire education), is therefore:
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W * nl = c + ( c - b + l )  /pL (3.1)
A non-funded student of type H, has a repayment probability 
Ph>Pl - Since the bank can identify an NH-type borrower, it 
sets rH=l/pH. It follows that NH has a reservation wage w*NH 
is such that:
w * N H  = c +(c - b + l)/pH (3.2)
Let us now turn to the case of funded individuals. F 
is able to secure funding through a family transfer which he 
promises to return at a later date. The family acts as a 
bank: it requests 1 / P f if F is successful, and zero
otherwise. F is therefore indifferent between using his 
family funds and borrowing from the credit market at a rate 
rF=l/pF. Assuming families are also risk-neutral, the 
transfer then induces a neutral effect on their welfare. In 
behavioural models of the family, it is assumed that parents 
make direct investments in the child's human capital (see 
for example Becker and Tomes (1986)). In such models, a 
tradeoff arises between the family's consumption and the 
child's quality. In the above sense, our assumption that 
family transfers are neutral, presents a departure from the 
economic models of the family*2*.
Since F does not borrow from the credit market, we can 
choose any value for the probability pF without changing the 
essence of the model. We let pF=pH. The reservation wage of 
F is therefore equal to that of NH:
w*F = w*NH = c +(c - b + l)/pH (3.3)
From equations 3.1-3 we can derive the labour supply 
schedule of the full information economy:
We can also view F as having wealth endowment m>l. Because of the risk- 
neutrality assumption ( implicit in the choice of the linear utility 
function), the exact value of m (provided m>l) will generally not matter to 
the reservation wage of F. Alternatively, we can view F has having obtained a 
state loan at the risk-free interest rate.
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G [ 0, Eh ]
0 w < c+(c-b+1 )/pH 
w = c+(c-b+1 )/pH
L S (w ) — ' Eh c+(c-b+1 )/pH < w <c+(c-b+1 )/pL 
[EH , Eh + El ] w = c+(c-b+1)/pL
(3.4)
Eh + El w > c+(c-b+1 )/pL
where
Eh - Ph [<J> + A,(l—<)>)] (3.5)
and
el = pL [(l-X)d-(J))] (3.6)
Eh denotes the maximum endowment of educated labour of the F 
and NH populations. There are <|) individuals of type F, and 
(1—(J))X, of type NH, each having a success probability pH. By 
the law of large numbers, the maximum endowment of educated 
labour arising from these two groups will be pH [<1> + A,(l—<J>)] , 
which we have defined in (3.5) above as the quantity EH. 
Likewise, EL can be interpreted as the maximum endowment of 
NL-type skilled work-force.
The labour supply schedule consists of two steps and is 
drawn in figure 3.2 below. Let the demand for skilled labour 
be a function LD(w,q). The labour market equilibrium occurs 
at the intersection of the supply and demand schedules. In 
the diagram we depict a situation where the labour market 
clears at the reservation wage of high return individuals,
i.e. at w= (c-b+1) /pH +c. When such a situation arises, y/pH 
high returns individuals acquire education. Of them, y 
individuals are successful and earn the wage (c-b+1 )/pH +c, 
(which is higher than the income poverty line 2c) . Thus, 
while in ex-ante terms all the high returns individuals are 
indifferent between either occupations, ex-post only y 
workers are able to escape poverty. The remaining 1-y 
workers in the economy join the subsistence occupation and 
are therefore poor in terms of either life-cycle income or 
human capital levels.
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wage
(c-b+1)/pL + c '
(c-b+1)/pH +c
Labour
EH EL+EHr
FIGURE 3.2: Labour market equilibrium in the Full Information
Economy
Under a regime of full information, the market 
equilibrium has the important property of being Pareto 
efficient. By this we mean that the price mechanism 
decentralizes the economy in a way that social surplus is 
maximized. If fewer than y persons (selected from F and NH 
types ) invest in human capital, there is under-investment 
in education at the social level. Conversely, if a fraction 
greater than y invest in education, there will be some 
socially inefficient investments that are undertaken. 
Finally, note that at the wage (c-b+1)/pH +c, there are no 
NL-type individuals investing in education. If a social 
planner were to place a low return student in education, the 
expected surplus from this decision would be pL(c-b+l)/pH 
+c+b. If NL were directed to the low skills occupation, 
social surplus would consist of one unit of money invested 
at the risk-free interest rate (zero) , plus the cumulated 
wage 2c of a subsistence sector worker. Social surplus 
under the latter choice is higher than under the former, by 
an amount (c+l-b)(1-Pl/Ph) •
3.4 Equilibrium Under Asymmetric Information
The aim of this chapter is to examine to what extent 
asymmetric information problems may contribute to the
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incidence of poverty. This section extends the discussion 
to deal with the adverse selection problem that arises in 
the credit market when the repayment probabilities of 
borrowers are not observable to banks.
Our starting point is to note the difference in the 
nature of equilibrium when the economy is operating in a 
regime of full information and asymmetric information. As 
pointed out by Akerlof(1970), markets operating under 
asymmetric information may have no equilibria. In the 
context of our model, the "lemons principle" operates on the 
demand side of the market since the quality of borrowers is 
uncertain to the suppliers of funds.
If there exists an equilibrium, it may come under two 
types: the pooling, and the separating types. A separating
equilibrium can obtain if there exists an activity in which 
NH may invest in order to signal his identity, which would 
be too costly for NL to undertake. Such an situation would 
be feasible if the returns to higher education were 
correlated with an observed characteristic of borrowers. 
Typically, wealth is often advocated to be a correlate of 
ability. Separating equilibria could for instance be 
envisaged if we assumed that NH could signal his type by 
requesting to borrow only a fraction of the loan, k<l, while 
NL could not costlessly mimic NH's behaviour because of his 
smaller wealth endowment. Nonetheless, since the assumption 
regarding the correlation of ability and wealth is highly 
controversial, and difficult to verify, we will do away 
with the possibility of signalling activities, and shall 
restrict ourselves to the investigation of pooling 
equilibria.
Let 7T(r,w) denote the average repayment probability of 
borrowers when the banks set the repayment value of the loan 
to r and the market wage is w. K is the expected value of p 
for those persons who finance their education through the 
credit market:
7C(r,w) = E [ p| b+p (w-r) + (1-p) c > 2c ] (4.1)
Equation (4.1) defines the demand for credit. The supply of 
credit is governed by the zero-profit condition of 
competitive markets:
nr -1 = 0 (4.2)
where the size of the loan is set equal to unity. If the 
market wage is w and the cost of the loan is r, NH has an 
expected return from education b+pH (w-r) + (l-pH) c . He 
therefore borrows and invests in his human capital if r< 
w + (b-c)/pH-c. Likewise, NL borrows if r<w+(b-c)/pL-c . 
Therefore,
where A,pH + (1 -X) pL is the average repayment probability of 
the non-funded population. Below we define this quantity as 
E (p) . When r>w-c-(c-b)/pH/ no one is interested in borrowing 
and the credit market shuts down. When the return to 
investment is not high enough to induce any borrowing , 
there is a situation of "financial collapse" (Mankiw(1986)), 
the limiting case of what Bernanke and Gertler(1990) call 
"financial fragility". Equating (4.2) and (4.3), we obtain 
the following two equilibria of the credit market:
r=l/pH for c+(c-b+1)/pH ^ w< c+l/pH+(c-b)/pL (4.4a)
tpH if w-c-(c-b)/pL < r < w-c-(c-b)/pH
n (r, w) = (4.3)
kpH + (l-X)pL if r < w+(b-c)/pL-c
r=l/[ XpH + (l-A,)pL] =1/E (p) for
w> c+(c-b)/pL + 1/E(p) (4.4b)
Let W  denote the wage interval:
[ c+l/pH+(c-b)/pL ;c+(c-b)/pL+l/E(p) ] (4.5)
We wish to inquire if for any wage w e W  the credit market 
admits equilibria with various proportions of high and low
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returns borrowers. If all the NH-type individuals, and a 
proportion 0 < a< 1 of the NL population borrow, then the 
average repayment probability must be
K = [ ^Ph+Pl (1“^) OC ] /(x+ (l-X)o) (4.6)
For low returns individuals to borrow when the lending rate 
is r, the market wage w must be high enough such that 
b+pL (w-r) + (l-pL) c > 2c. Since, by the zero-profit condition, 
r=l/n , the reservation wage of an NL-type borrower is then:
w *nl = c+ (c-b)/pL + (\+(l-\)a) / [XpH+pL(l-^)a] (4.7)
when a->0, there are only high returns borrowers, so that 
w*nl approaches the lower bound of the wage interval W. 
Likewise, when a->l, all the low returns individuals borrow, 
and w*NL approaches the upper bound of the wage interval W. 
The intuition behind the result is the following: for the
credit market to accommodate greater numbers of low return 
borrowers, a rise in the interest rate is required in order 
to compensate lenders for the increase in default rates. 
When the lending rate rises, so must the reservation wages 
of borrowers increase.
Solving for a in (4.7) we have
a (w) =
1-X
pH(w - c - (c - b)/pL} - 1 
1 - Pl(w - c - (c - b)/pL} (4.8)
so that for w e W, labour supply of non-funded low returns 
individuals equals a(w)EL .
We now proceed to construct the labour supply schedule 
of the economy within the context of the asymmetric
information regime. We first note that F does not have any
incentive to borrow: if r=l/pH he is indifferent between
borrowing and using his own funds, when r>l/pH he never 
borrows. His reservation wage therefore remains unchanged at 
c + (c-b + 1)/pH. The reservation wage of NH also remains 
unchanged: when r=l/pH, the lowest wage that will induce
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him to invest in education is also c+(c-b+1)/pH. On the 
other hand, as a result of the inability of banks to
distinguish between borrowers, NL can borrow at the interest 
rate r=l/7t, as opposed to l/pL within the full information 
scenario. The lowest wage that may induce an NL type person 
to borrow is given by (4.7), which for all values 0 < (X <
1, is lower than the corresponding value under the full
information assumption.
It is worth asking how the reduction in N L ' s
reservation wage arises. When the demand for skilled labour 
is relatively high, the credit market can allocate funds to 
cover agents with varying degrees of returns to education. 
The credit market then implicitly redistributes income from 
individuals with above average returns, to those with below 
average returns to education. That is, NL's reservation wage 
drops, because through the market allocation of credit NH 
implicitly subsidizes the former's loan.
wage
c+(c-b)/pL +1/E(p)
c+l/pH+(c-b)/pL
c+(c-b+1)/pH
Labour
EH EL+EH
FIGURE 3. 3:Labour Supply under Asymmetric Information
The labour supply schedule can therefore be constructed 
as follows:
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LS(w) =
r0 w < c+(c-b+1)/pH
e [0,EH ] w = c+(c-b+1)/pH
Eh c+(c-b+1)/pH < w < c+l/pH+(c-b)/pL 
Eh+cc(w)El w e W,
Eh + El w > c + (c-b)/pL+l/E(p)
(4.9)
where W  is the wage interval defined in equation (4.5) 
above. Differentiating a(w) in (4.8), we note that its first 
and second derivatives are positive for all wages w e W . The 
labour supply schedule is sketched in figure 3.3 above.
As usual, the labour market clears at intersection 
of the supply and demand schedules. The consequences of 
asymmetric information on the incidence of poverty are 
spelled out in the section below.
3.5 Consequences for Wages and Poverty
One of the aims of this work is to characterize the 
effects of credit market imperfections on the incidence of 
poverty. As a starting point in our inquiry, we superpose 
the full information and the asymmetric information labour 
supply schedules of figures 3.3 and 3.4.
wage
c+(c-b+1)/pL
c+(c-b)/pL+ 1/E(p)
asymmetric
information
c+l/pH+(c-b)/pL
full
information
c+(c-b+1)/pH
Labour
EL+EHEH
Fiaure 3.4: Labour suoolv under both information reaimes
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As we shall see shortly, the consequences of asymmetric 
information on the incidence of poverty, will depend on the 
level of demand for skilled labour. Implicit to our analysis 
is the assumption that production in the advanced sector 
is characterized by decreasing returns, and that the price 
of the output is exogenously determined (as would be the 
case for a small open economy). We denote the labour demand 
schedule by LD(w,q), so that shifts in the demand for labour 
can be indexed by changes in the parameter q. We will 
consider four cases below, depending on the level of the 
shift parameter q.
case l:q0< q ^ qi
We note first that for there to be an advanced sector 
in the economy, the demand for labour must at least attain 
LD(w,q0) so that the equilibrium wage attains the minimum 
value c+(c-b+1)/pH.
wage
c+(c-b+1)/pH
LD(w,ql)
LabourLD(w,qo)
EH EL+EH
FIGURE 3.5 : The Low Wage Economy
Below LD(w,q0) the modern sector would not be viable and the 
economy would devote all its productive resources to 
subsistence activities. When q0<q^qi/ the expected payoff to 
advanced sector workers is equal to 2c. In an ex-ante sense, 
we are in the context of an income-poor economy. Ex-post 
though, those individuals who are successful in their
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training earn the wage c+(c-b+1)/pH and therefore cross the 
income poverty line.
In the low wage economy, the demand for skilled labour 
is not high enough to induce NL to study. Thus, NH borrows 
on the same terms as he would in a regime of full 
information. Both labour supply curves overlap, so that the 
asymmetric information regime leaves wages and employment in 
the high skills sector unchanged. This result can be 
explained by noting that when wages are too low to attract 
NL, there is no information asymmetry as such between 
borrowers and lenders. The market equilibrium of the low 
wage economy is identical under both information regimes, 
and so is the incidence of poverty.
case 2 : qi < q < q2 .
When the demand for labour rises to the intermediary 
region, the net payoff to higher education rises above 2c. 
On the basis of either income or human capital concepts, the 
poverty count is 1-EH since all successful high returns 
workers are absorbed by the advanced sector.
wage
c+1/pH+(c-b)/pL
c+(c-b+1)/pH
LD (w, q2)
LD{w,ql)
Labour
EH EL+EH
FIGURE 3.6: The intermediary economy
Since in the intermediary economy wages remain too low to 
attract low return borrowers, both labour supply curves
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overlap. Wages and poverty therefore remain identical under 
both regimes.
case 3 q2 < q ^ q3 .
By a high wage economy, we mean that wages are high 
enough to attract low returns workers to the advanced 
sector.
wage
c+(c-b+1)/pL
LD(w,q3)
c+l/pH+(c-b)/pL
LD(w,q*)
LD(w,q2)
Labour
EL+EHEH L* L**
FIGURE 3.7: The high wage economy
As was explained in the previous section, the reduction in 
NL's reservation wage is achieved via an implicit subsidy of 
his loan, originating from NH.Because the asymmetric 
information labour supply schedule lies below the full 
information one (in the region q2 < q < q3 ) , wages will be 
lower and employment higher as a result of the credit 
market imperfections. When the demand for labour is 
LD (w, q*) (3) , the economy operating in a regime of full 
information would have a proportion 1-L* of its work-force 
in poverty. Within the context of the adverse selection 
regime, the incidence of poverty is reduced to 1-L**. It is 
important to note that from an efficiency point of view 
social surplus is maximised when L* individuals invest in
Note that LD(w,q*) can intersect the two labour supply curves in four 
different ways. It can cut the full information schedule in its horizontal 
segment or its vertical segment. Likewise, LD(w,q*) can cut the asymmetric 
information labour supply in its curved segment and its vertical segment.
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education. The reduction of poverty obtained in the 
asymmetric information regime therefore arises because of 
over-investment in education (4) . An NL-type person gains, 
whereas F and NL see education less profitable in the 
adverse selection regime than in the full information set-up 
of the high wage economy.
Case 4: q > q3
When the labour demand schedule is situated above 
LD(w,q3), all the labour force invests in education. Such an 
economy has reached its full productive capacity under both 
information regimes. Further increases in the demand for 
skilled labour result in higher wages but no further supply 
of workers. In this sense the economy can be said to have 
reached ful1-employment.
wage
w-
c+(c-b+1)/pL
c+(c-b)/pL+l/E(p) LD(w,q~)
LD(w,q3)
Labour
EL+EHEH
Figure 3.8 : The Full-Employment Economy
The resulting market wage exceeds the reservation wage of NL 
within the context of a full information regime, and 
therefore both labour supply schedules overlap. As in the 
case of the low wage and intermediary economies, the
This is a standard result in screening models of the labour market. See 
for instance Spence (1973).
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case of the low wage and intermediary economies, the 
existence of asymmetric information in the credit market has 
a neutral effect on wages and poverty . This is illustrated 
in figure 3.8. When the labour demand is LD(w,q~), the 
resulting wage is w~ under both regimes.
The conclusion that emerges from this section is that 
the adverse selection problem in the credit market will 
generally not result in higher levels of poverty. The low 
wage and intermediary economies are characterized by 
sufficiently low levels of demand for skilled labour, so 
that wages and poverty are identical under both information 
regimes. High wage economies on the other hand, achieve 
lower levels of poverty in presence of the adverse selection 
regime. In the limiting case of the full-employment economy, 
both information regimes entail the same outcome with 
respect to wages and poverty.
3.6 Implications for Poverty Reduction Policies
Since education is an important channel by means of 
which individuals can invest in their human capital, the 
existence of asymmetric information problems in the economy 
gives rise to a substantial role for government policy on 
education and poverty. The purpose of this section will be 
to examine with the help of our model , the scope for 
government intervention in the labour market for the 
purpose of reducing poverty. Other equally important social 
objectives on education relate to efficiency and equality 
of opportunity matters.
Our discussion will be mainly centred around the 
question of poverty reduction. Efficiency questions have 
been dealt with in Mankiw (1986), Bernanke and Gertler 
(1990), and in Hoff (1991). The relationship between 
poverty, education, and equality of opportunity was dealt 
with, in Bowles (1973).
If the government wishes to pursue poverty reduction 
policies it can intervene in either of the credit or labour 
markets. Credit subsidies could lower the reservation wages 
of workers. Equivalently, wage subsidies could result in
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higher levels of employment in the advanced sector. Here we 
limit ourselves to intervention in the labour market.
One way of reducing poverty would consist in using 
profits in order to subsidize wages. Since we have assumed a 
decreasing returns to scale technology, it follows that the 
average product of labour, G(L,q)/L, exceeds its marginal 
product at any level of employment
wage
wa
Labour
La EL+EHEH Lc
Figure 3.9: Poverty Minimum
The shaded region in figure 3.9 represents the feasible set 
of wages and employment the advance sector can reach given 
its labour force and its production technology G(L,q). For a 
given level of employment, wages cannot exceed the average 
product of labour, since then profits would be negative. 
Conversely, to induce participation of workers, wages must 
not fall short’ of the reservation wage corresponding to the 
given level of employment. Thus, any pair (L,w) must be 
chosen inside the shaded area.
A social planner concerned with poverty minimisation 
would therefore choose to set employment at its highest 
possible level. The point (La,wa) where the labour supply and 
average product of labour curves intersect is the maximum 
employment level attainable in the advanced sector, and thus 
the minimum feasible poverty level. The unregulated market
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equilibrium on the other hand has Lc workers in the advanced 
sector. The poverty reducing policy therefore consists in 
subsidizing wages by whatever profits may be available. At 
La, the marginal product of labour is lower than wa/ so that 
a subsidy x (per worker) is required to make up for the 
difference. Such a policy would allow a further reduction of 
poverty by an amount La-Lc.
It is important to note that only under a constant- 
returns-to-scale assumption will the market equilibrium of 
the (asymmetric information regime) automatically attain the 
poverty minimum. This is because when there are constant 
returns to scale, marginal and average products coincide and 
profits are null. In presence of decreasing returns, 
government intervention in the form of profit taxes and wage 
subsidies, will allow further reductions in poverty over the 
unregulated market equilibrium.
As can be seen from figure 3.9, poverty reduction has 
to be traded off against efficiency losses. The efficient 
level of employment obtains at the intersection of the 
marginal product of labour and the labour supply of the full 
information regime, i.e. at EH. Poverty reduction is 
obtained through the combined effect of wage subsidies and 
profit taxes, which induces over-investment in education. 
Efficiency considerations therefore call for a contraction 
of employment in the advanced sector. Concerns about poverty 
on the other hand, call for an expansion of employment.
3.7 Conclusions
It ' is well understood by now that information 
asymmetries in the credit market may distort the allocation 
of investment from the social optimum. This work has 
examined the consequences of asymmetric information on 
poverty. We have shown that credit market imperfections may 
have a neutral effect on poverty, but they may also reduce 
it. The latter possibility was shown to arise in high wage 
economies. There, through the market allocation of credit, 
individuals with above average returns to education 
subsidize those with below average returns.
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A conclusion that emerges from the work, is the 
importance of assessing the likely effects of efficiency 
enhancing policies on the incidence of poverty. One 
consequence of information asymmetries in the credit market, 
is the resulting over-investment in education that may arise 
in the market equilibrium. Policies aimed at raising social 
surplus will then reduce investment in education, and hence 
will result in poverty increases. It is thus important that 
poverty reduction does not escape unnoticed as a goal, 
especially when efficiency gains have to be traded off 
against poverty increases.
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CHAPTER 4
A Justice Criterion Pertaining to Intergenerational Mobility
Processes
4.1 Introduction
One important conclusion that emerges from the model of 
the previous chapter, is the importance of family background 
in the determination of income. In chapter 3 we saw that 
non-funded individuals with high returns on their human 
capital investments (NH) were at disadvantaged with respect 
to their funded counterparts (FH), since high return 
borrowers implicitly had to subsidize the loans of low 
return borrowers. Given these differing initial 
circumstances of individuals, what distribution of income 
today constitutes a just state of affairs?
The question we are dealing with in this chapter can 
more generally be formulated within the context of the 
normative assessment of intergenerational mobility 
processes. Given a joint distribution of income f(x,y) for 
parents and children pairs, we wish to decide whether the 
given outcome characterizes a just state of affairs. We 
divide the population of children into various groups, 
according to their socio-economic backgrounds, and suggest 
to qualify the process f(x,y) as unjust or unfair(1) , if any 
single one of these groups enjoys a superior distribution of 
welfare than any other one.
We begin our discussion with the following question: if 
say 1 0 % of the population today are poor, would it be 
irrelevant if these individuals all originated from low 
income families, or would it be a preferred state of affairs 
if these individuals had purely random socio-economic 
backgrounds? We take the view that who low income earners
(1) Here we take justice and fairness as synonyms. In social choice theory, 
fairness is associated with the concepts of envy and equitability. See 
Hammond (1987) for a discussion.
99
are today matters, not just how many of them there are. 
Presumably if asked to choose, most of us would perceive the 
second state of affairs, where the poor are of mixed 
origins, as being preferable to the case where they all 
originate from poor families.
If this is indeed the case, we need to further inquire 
as to why the socio-economic origins of individuals should 
be of relevance in the normative assessment of 
intergenerational mobility processes. Atkinson et al. (1983) 
pp. 14-15, argue that when individuals live for several 
periods, a high degree of intergenerational mobility may be 
viewed as instrumental to securing a higher level of 
equality of life-time incomes. For example, assume that 
individuals live for two periods, first as children, then as 
parents. A high degree of intergenerational mobility would 
ensure that those who had low living standards in their 
childhood, would thus not be further penalized during their 
parenthood, and that the benefits of being born wealthy are 
not further expanded over the life cycle.
Broadly speaking, we can distinguish two approaches 
with regards to the conception of economic justice. In the 
first approach the emphasis is laid on studying the 
processes by which incomes are determined and goods are 
allocated to the different members of society. In the second 
approach the assessment of justice is made on the basis of 
the outcomes, or results, of the market process.
In the context of the subject of the present work, 
following the first approach would lead us to study the 
process by which the incomes of parents are mapped onto 
those of their children. Typically, equality of opportunity 
arguments arise from this stance. If say, discrimination in 
access to education and employment are at the cause of the 
observed pattern of intergenerational mobility, then we may 
argue that justice is violated. In the first approach it is 
therefore actions of individuals as opposed to outcomes 
which form the basis of justice assessment. In the words of 
Hayek (1982), justice would proceed,
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"...according to rules guiding the actions of individual participants 
whose aims, skills, and knowledge are different, with the consequence 
that the outcome will be unpredictable and that there will regularly 
be winners and losers. And while, as in a game, we are right in 
insisting that it be fair and that nobody cheat, it would be 
nonsensical to demand that the results for the different players be 
just. "
The second approach stands in contrast to the former, in the 
sense that it is solely the results of actions which guide 
our judgements. An often invoked principle related to the 
outcomes approach, is that of consequentialism. In that 
context, Sen (1988) writes:
"...all choice variables, such as actions, rules, institutions, etc, 
must be judged in terms of the goodness of their respective 
consequences."
A well known justice concept which follows from the outcomes 
school, is Rawls'(1971) difference, or maximin principle. 
According to the difference principle, incomes and other 
fundamental goods, are to be distributed equally, and 
inequalities should only be tolerated in the case that they 
raise the welfare of the least well-off members of society.
In proposing a justice criterion related to 
intergenerational mobility processes, we shall be following 
the outcomes approach. Our justice criterion is a judgement 
on the income distributions of children originating from 
different socio-economic groups. Let us temporarily go back 
to the justice assessment of single income distributions, 
as opposed to the joint distribution of incomes of parents 
and children. In the context of a univariate distribution, 
it is common in the outcomes approach to associate justice 
with a scenario of equal incomes. The maximisation of a sum 
of increasing and concave identical utility functions, under
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the assumption that national income is constant, has for 
solution the equal sharing of the cake(2).
Let us divide the population of children into two 
socio-economic groups: the first group is that of the
disadvantaged ones, and the second one consists of the 
privileged. The classification is based on the socio­
economic status of parents, which we also refer to as the 
family background of children. Each of these groups is 
associated with an income distribution f(y|Xi), where Xi 
indexes the socio-economic origin of the child. Over which 
dimension should the principle of equality be defined in 
the analysis of groups of individuals as opposed to single 
units? In moving from a unique set of individuals to the 
analysis of groups of individuals, one possibility would be 
to replace the principle of equality of incomes by a 
principle of equality of distributions.
Equality of distributions for the two groups of 
children is statistically equivalent to a concept of 
independence from the socio-economic origin. To see that 
this is the case, note that the latter condition implies 
that f (y | Xi) =f (y |X2 ) =f * . That is, when distributions are 
equal, children raised in privileged and disadvantaged 
environments do equally well on average.
The concept of equality of distributions may be viewed 
as a rather strong requirement, and perhaps requires 
formulation in a more general context. One possible 
extension would be to replace the condition of equality of 
distributions by one of equality of aggregate welfare 
levels. Let U define the class of increasing and concave 
utility functions. Also assume that social welfare for group 
i is measured by the sum J u (y) f (y | Xi) dy, where u is a 
member of U. Whereas equality of distributions requires that 
f (y|X i) = f (y |X 2 )# equality of welfare obtains when 
J u  (y) f (y | Xi) dy = Ju (y) f (y | X2 ) dy. Under the condition of 
equality of welfare, the two income distributions need not 
be identical. The income distribution for the children of
Other generalizations of this result can be found for instance in Sen 
(1973) .
102
disadvantaged backgrounds could for instance have a lower 
mean income than the corresponding distribution for the 
privileged children. But provided f(y|Xi) is sufficiently 
more equally distributed than f(y|X2 ), the two distributions 
may achieve identical levels of aggregate welfare.
The principle of equality of welfare may appear once 
again fairly intractable in empirical applications. 
Agreement on whether justice obtains could only be achieved 
conditional on the full parametrization of the utility 
function u(). In this sense/ a more flexible criterion could 
allow for different views on the form of the utility 
function. Let ua and Ub be any two distinct members of the 
class U of utility functions, and consider the following 
three cases:
(I) For all u g U, J u (y) f (y | Xi) dy > J u (y) f (y |Xj) dy. 
That is, for any increasing and concave utility function, 
the children originating from group i are better off than 
those of originating from group j. Stated differently, there 
is a situation of welfare dominance in favour of the 
children from group i.
(II) J ua(y) f (y |Xi)dy > j  ua (y) f (y |X2 ) dy, while
J Ub (y) f (y | Xi) dy < J ub(y) f (y |X2 ) dy. That is, depending on 
the choice of the utility function, it may be the case that 
children of disadvantaged origins are perceived as being 
better off than the privileged ones, and vice versa.
(III) Equality of distributions: f(y|Xi) =f(y|X2 )=f* . 
All groups of individuals enjoy the same distribution of 
living standards regardless of their socio-economic origins.
Scenario (I) is a clear-cut case where the living 
standards of groups of individuals are determined by their 
socio-economic origins, and the welfare ranking of income 
distributions holds for any increasing and concave utility 
function. The justice criterion we propose in this work 
defines scenario (I) as a case of injustice. Under scenario 
(III) all groups enjoy identical living standards regardless 
of their socio-economic origins. Since all income 
distributions are equal, this conclusion must be valid for 
all u e U. We therefore take scenario (III) to be one where
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there is absence of injustice. Scenario (II) is the 
intermediary situation where we are not able to conclude 
which of the two distributions will entail a higher level of 
welfare without further knowledge on the form of the utility 
function u(). When such a situation arises, we are not able 
to qualify an intergenerational mobility process f(x,y) with 
respect to the presence or absence of injustice.
The outline of the chapter is the following. In the 
next section we present our proposed criterion for the 
justice assessment of intergenerational mobility processes. 
Our justice concept may be endorsed by certain theories of 
justice, but may also clash with others. We also take up 
this point in section 4.2. In section 4.3 we contrast our 
justice index with existing measures of intergenerational 
mobility. In section 4.4 we explain how the proposed index 
can be implemented with sample data. As shown by 
Shorrocks(1983), the ranking of income distributions can be 
carried out via the comparison of Generalized Lorenz curves 
for a wide class of social welfare functions. Since 
distribution-free methods exist for the estimation of 
Lorenz curves (see for instance Beach and Davidson(1983)), 
the conclusions derived on the basis of our justice index 
can be fairly general with regards to both the underlying 
social welfare function, and the parametric family of the 
income distribution. In section 4.5 we discuss some of the 
data limitations we face in the analysis of 
intergenerational mobility processes. We then proceed in 
section 4.6 to the empirical applications. Our final section 
concludes the chapter.
4.2 Justice and Welfare Dominance
We suggest that the potential for ranking the income 
distributions of the various socio-economic groups should 
constitute the basis of the justice assessment of 
intergenerational mobility processes. The socio-economic 
classification is based on the family background of 
individuals. For the purpose of ranking income
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distributions, we will restrict ourselves to welfare 
functions of the utilitarian type:
W< yi,...,yn ) = £ u(yi) (a)
so that the welfare function is anonymous, and the utility
level of each individual depends solely on his income level 
y. We also assume that W exhibits a social aversion to 
inequality, so that mean-preserving progressive transfers 
are assumed to increase welfare. This amounts to a property 
of concavity of the individual utility functions(3) .
u" (y) < 0 (b)
In order to capture the desire for higher incomes, we will
let W be a non-decreasing function of all incomes:
W( yi,...,yn ) is non-decreasing in yi (c)
The monotonicity of W(.) is one way of capturing social 
preference for efficiency. The properties (a)-(c) amount to 
a choice of a utility function which is increasing and 
concave, i.e. u() must be chosen from the set U of utility 
functions.
Let f(.) and F(.) respectively denote the density 
function, and the cumulative distribution function, of y. 
Also, define Y= ( yi,...,yn )' as the vector of incomes. The 
pth income quantile Ep is defined via the following 
equality.
F(ep) = p (2.1)
If say, p=0.5, then Eq.5 the median income in the 
population. Corresponding to a set of k horizontal ordinates 
Pl<P2 <...<Pk# we have a set of k income quantiles &i< 
e2<...<£k' more generally known as order statistics. The
The condition can be weakened to a property of "S-concavity" of W , so 
that W( B Y) ^ W(Y) for all bi-stochastic matrices B, where Y= ( ...,yn ) '
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Lorenz curve ordinate at p is defined as the fraction of 
mean income held by the bottom p percent of the population:
reP
LC(p) = 1  In LJ o y f(y) dy (2.2)
The Generalized Lorenz curve, introduced by Shorrocks 
(1983), is defined as the Lorenz curve multiplied by mean 
income:
Also, Let W denote the set of social welfare functions 
satisfying properties (a) to (c) . Shorrocks (1983) proves 
the following theorem:
W(Yi)>W(Y2) for all W e W iff GLCi(p) > GLC2 (p) p=l,..,k
In other terms, the distribution Yi will be preferred to Y2 
for all W e W, if and only if GLCi- the Generalized Lorenz 
curve of Yi, lies nowhere below GLC2 - the corresponding 
curve for Y2. The comparison of Generalized Lorenz curves of 
various socio-economic groups will thus enable us to 
investigate the fairness of intergenerational mobility 
processes.
Define x as the income variable of the first generation 
which we refer to as parents. Also, let
x e Xi if the parents are disadvantaged
x e X2 otherwise 
Aggregate welfare of children originating from class i is 
therefore:
GLC(p) y f(y) dy (2.3)
W( yi,...,yn |Xi)= j u ( y )  f ( y  | Xi)dy (2.4)
We suggest to qualify an intergenerational mobility process 
as unjust if either of the two income distributions f(y|Xi) 
and f(y|x2) welfare dominates the other. Geometrically, the
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justice requirement can be stated in terms of Generalized 
Lorenz curves. Let GLCi denote the Generalized Lorenz curve 
for the children of socio-economic background Xi. Then an 
intergenerational mobility process f(x/y) exhibits 
injustice if either of the two Generalized Lorenz curves 
lies nowhere below the other.
In figure 4.1 we consider two hypothetical cases. 
Under both scenarios the children from privileged origins 
enjoy a higher mean income than their counterparts from the 
other group. Under case (i) we have a scenario of injustice. 
That is, W(yi,...,yn |X2 ) > W(yi,...,yn |xi) for all W e W 
so that the distribution of income for children from 
privileged groups dominates that of the children from 
disadvantaged backgrounds. In other words, the advantages 
of being raised in privileged backgrounds tend to maintain 
themselves over the working life.
GLC2,curve for 
priviliged group
case (i)
GLCI, curve for 
disadvantaged group
income
deciles
GLC2,curve for 
priviliged group
case (ii)
GLCI, curve for 
disadvantaged group
income
deciles
FIGURE 4.1: Justice and the Generalized Lorenz dominance criterion
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Case (ii) on the other hand has the two Generalized Lorenz 
curves intersecting. That is, for some social welfare 
functions, the disadvantaged children would appear to be 
better off than the children from the other group. Under 
case (ii) one cannot unambiguously state that initial 
advantages are compounded over the life cycle, so that we 
cannot conclude whether there is a situation of injustice. 
We summarize these points in definition 2.1:
DEFINITION 2.1 : Let there be two socio-economic classes: 
and X2. Then
(i) An intergenerational mobility process f(x,y) exhibits 
injustice if either f(yjxi) welfare dominates f(y\xg) or 
vice-versa if f(y/X2) welfare dominates f(y/xi).
(ii) f(x,y) cannot be qualified with respect to the 
existence of injustice if f(y/xi) and f(y\X2) cannot be 
ranked in terms of welfare dominance.
(Hi) f(x,y) does not exhibit injustice if f(y/Xi)= f(y\X2).
A numerical example
Let us illustrate the above statements with the help of 
a numerical example. Assume the joint distribution of income 
of parents and children is the following:
P=
1/12 0 5/12
0 3/12 3/12
where Pij denotes the proportion of (x,y) observations such 
that the parent belong to socio-economic class i, and the 
child belongs to socio-economic class j . Parents are 
classified into the two groups, i=l,2. Children on the other 
hand are classified into three income groups (also in 
increasing order). The marginal income distribution of 
fathers is obtained by summing up the columns over the 
appropriate line:
Pi. = Pij
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where pi. denotes the probability that a father belongs to 
class i. Likewise,
p.j = Pij
and from the laws of probability
Pi. = X. p.j = X  X  p n =  1Pij:
The ijth element of IT, the transition matrix, is defined as 
the probability that the child is in income class j, given 
that the he originates from group i. From Bayes' theorem,
7Cij=Pij / Pi.
so that each line of the transition matrix denotes a 
probability distribution. In our numerical example 7Cij=2pij, 
i.e.,
1/6 o 5/6n=
- 0 1/2 1/2 J
To see that n cannot be qualified with respect to the 
existence of injustice, we note that if from society's point 
of view, the social utility of being in income class j is 
Uj, where say ui=l, U2=3/2, and U3 = 15/8, then welfare is 
higher for the children originating from disadvantaged 
backgrounds. On the other hand, if say ui=l, U2=3/2, while 
u3=13/8, the second line of the transition matrix dominates 
the first. In terms of Generalized Lorenz curves, we obtain 
a scenario similar to that sketched in case (ii) of figure 
4.1. Now if we change the joint distribution of parent's 
and children's incomes in order to obtain the transition 
matrix n*
n* = 0.5
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.5
Then for all W e W, the bottom line of n* will always 
exhibit a higher level of aggregate welfare than the top 
line. Hence, as sketched in case (i) of figure 4,1, The GLC
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curve of children from privileged backgrounds lies nowhere 
below the corresponding curve for the children from 
disadvantaged backgrounds. In this sense, the 
intergenerational mobility process of n* does not exhibit 
fairness. Finally, if both lines of the transition matrix 
are identical, we can reject the assumption that the 
underlying intergenerational mobility process exhibits 
injustice.
★ * *
Note that definition 2.1 can be re-formulated within 
the context of c > 2 socio-economic groups. For instance we 
might be interested in looking at three groups, where say X2 
would index the children originating from middle classes 
while X3 would pertain to those of the most privileged 
backgrounds. The three conditions would then be formulated 
as follows: (i) there is injustice if for any pair (i,j) the
distributions f(y|Xi) and f(y|Xj) can be ranked in terms of 
welfare dominance, (ii) f(x,y) cannot be qualified with 
respect to injustice if no single pair of distributions can 
be ranked in terms of welfare dominance and, (iii) f(x,y) 
does not exhibit injustice if for all i f (y |Xj_) =f *, that is 
under a scenario of equality of all c conditional income 
distributions.
At this stage it is worth noting some of the 
limitations underlying our approach. In extending the 
analysis to incorporate c> 2 income groups, a situation may 
arise whereby a conclusion is reached on the basis of c 
groups, and another one obtains using c+1 classes. Many of 
the mobility measures based on transition matrices also 
suffer from this problem (cf. section 4.3 below). Also, 
underlying the c income classes is a continuous variable, 
namely life-cycle income. In general, discretizing a 
continuous Markov Process may result in a poor approximation 
of the underlying true process (see Feller (1968), vol. I 
for a discussion). In this sense, adopting the stochastic 
kernel approach developed in Quah (1994) would be a useful 
extension in the normative assessment of intergenerational 
mobility processes.
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Finally, we note that the definition of a generation is 
not a clear-cut time unit. A process may exhibit injustice 
on the basis of say, an 18 year time period separating the 
observation of the incomes of parents and children, but the 
role of family background in the determination of income may 
vanish when the length of a generation is taken as twenty 
five years. It would therefore be useful to examine the 
possibility of introducing a period invariance axiom (cf. 
Shorrocks (1978)) in the framework we have suggested.
Going back to the simple case of two socio-economic 
groups, when the justice condition is violated there are two 
scenarios of relevance. The first is one where 
W(yi, . . . ,yn | Xi) > W(yi,...,yn |X2 ) for all W e W so that the 
distribution of income for children from disadvantaged 
groups dominates that of the children from privileged 
backgrounds. Conversely, the other scenario is the opposite 
case when W(yi,...,yn |Xi) < W(yi,...,yn |X2 ) for all W e W 
where the advantages of being born in privileged families 
are not wiped out over generations. Both of these scenarios 
can form bases for claims of intergenerational justice. We 
take up this point below.
Some theories hold that justice is a social contract 
without which individual members of society would be worse 
off. Plato's accounts in the Republic for the existence of 
justice have been formalized in the second half of this 
century using bargaining concepts(3) . As a result of the 
bargaining approach, initial conditions of parties (known as 
status quo points in game theory) were given great 
importance in the determination of "fair" allocations of 
resources. If initial conditions are given a role to play in 
the fair division of resources, we may modify our justice 
criterion in two directions. The first would be to argue 
that since advantaged groups (in theory) have less to gain 
from income redistribution than the poor, justice could 
prevail if the children from privileged backgrounds were 
better off than those from disadvantaged origins, provided
For a discussion see Barry (1989) ch.2
Ill
the difference in living standards of these two groups was 
not too high.
By taking into account initial conditions, we can argue 
for an opposite recommendation: that justice prevails only 
when the children of the poor are made better off than the 
children from privileged backgrounds. One way to do so 
would be to appeal to Nozick's (1974) entitlements theories. 
Nozick's concern is not with the allocation of resources 
reached, but rather with the process with which it is 
reached. If indeed discrimination and unequal educational 
opportunities are the mechanisms which are at the root of 
the inheritance of low income, than we may according to 
entitlements theories, wish to compensate the children of 
the poor for their disadvantage. In theory nothing precludes 
us from envisaging a scenario whereby the order of dominance 
of distributions is reversed in the name of justice. If on 
the other hand it were ability differentials as opposed to 
unequal economic opportunities which were at the root of the 
dominance of income distributions, Nozick's entitlement 
theories would no longer give us any rationale for 
redistribution. Under the later scenario, the children from 
privileged backgrounds are entitled to their superior 
ability endowments, and the market process is fair. Any 
redistribution of income would then constitute a violation 
of rights and would thus be unjust.
In the next section we contrast our proposed criterion 
of justice with well known measures of intergenerational 
mobility. These include the regression coefficient between 
the incomes of parents and children, and the Atkinson 
(1981) class of measures(4) .
4.3 Relation to other approaches
To many economists, the concept of justice is taken as 
synonym for the maximization of social welfare. The origin
' ' The discussion that follows is by no means exhaustive, and more complete 
reviews can be found in Schokkaert and Van de gaer (1993), and Dardanoni 
(1991). Also see Atkinson et al. (1992) and Bartholomew (1973).
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of this association is perhaps due to Mill's conception of 
justice as a maximizing theory of a utilitarian objective, 
as well as the subsequent formalizations of Vickrey (1945) 
and Harsanyi (1953,55). Yet many political philosophers do 
not endorse the view that the maximization of a social 
welfare function is an adequate concept of justice. In this 
context, Ryan (1993) p.5, writes:
"Here it is enough to notice that it is hard to believe that justice 
is wholly explained by utility, as that it has nothing to do with 
utility at all."
In a review article on economic justice, Sen (1987) writes:
"...it is fair to say that in traditional welfare economics, when the 
notion of justice has been invoked, it has typically been seen only as 
a part of a bigger exercise, viz., that of social welfare maximization 
rather than taking justice as an idea that commands attention on its 
own."
The necessity of separating out the concepts of justice 
and social welfare maximization, has become more apparent 
with the development of non-utilitarian theories of justice 
in the last two decades. The work of Rawls (1971) places 
liberty ahead of aggregate welfare maximization, Nozick 
(1974) gives priority to entitlements, while Sen (1985) 
takes capabilities as being the appropriate concept of 
assessing people's advantage. Our justice criterion does 
fall in this latter category. It differs from the 
utilitarian objective of maximizing social welfare, by 
giving priority to the condition of welfare dominance.
Shorrocks (1978) follows an axiomatic approach to the 
measurement of mobility. Though his work pertains to 
mobility transition matrices, it is of relevance to our 
discussion. To see that this is the case, recall that each 
line of a transition matrix defines a conditional 
probability distribution (as discussed in section 4.2). 
Thus, within our framework if we were to consider c income
i
f
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groups, and if were to group data also over c income 
groups, our approach would amount to making normative 
! judgements on the basis of a c x c transition matrix.
Shorrocks considers several axioms, of which we 
discuss the following four:
(N): Normalization; a mobility index M takes values in 
the interval [0 ,1 ].
(M) : Monotonicity; if the probability of exiting a
particular state increases, then mobility should be higher.
Two axioms follow from the normalization and 
mono tonicity axioms:
(I) : Immobility; the identity matrix takes the minimum 
value of the index, M(I)=0.
(PM) : Perfect Mobility; if for a transition matrix Q, 
for all i and j the probability qij is independent of the 
original position i, M(Q)=1.
Shorrocks points out that the axioms may clash since N, 
M and PM are generally incompatible. However, Geweke et al. 
(1986) theorem 1 , are able to show that for all transition 
matrices with real non-negative eigen-values the above 
axioms are mutually consistent.
Let us examine whether our injustice index is 
consistent with the above axioms. (N) does not raise any 
problems since the judgements we make are qualitative in 
nature. Shorrocks' immobility axiom is compatible with (i)of 
our definition 2 .1 , since under (i) all income distributions 
of second generation groups of individuals can be ranked 
independently of the exact form of u(.). (PM) is the 
counter-part of (iii) in definition 2 .1 ; where injustice is 
rejected when the various conditional income distributions 
are identical. However, the two approaches differ with 
respect to Shorrocks' monotonicity axiom. (M) does not 
appear to be sensitive to the direction of mobility from the 
diagonal; i.e upward and downward mobility a priori seem to 
receive symmetric treatments.
To clarify this point, write the ith line of a 
transition matrix Q as qi=[ qn, qiir...#qic] • Define
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now the transition matrix Ql which differs from Q in that 
the ith line is replaced by
qi1=[<2il, • • • f Qii-1 / Qii-e.Qii+i + qicl
Also define Q2, where the ith line of Q is replaced by
qi2= t qii > . ..»qii-i - e, qii + qii+i,. ♦ ♦, qicl
Under the monotonicity axiom of Shorrocks Ql and Q2 would be 
more mobile than Q, however Ql and Q2 do not receive 
separate treatment with respect to mobility. However, axioms 
of efficiency preference and inequality aversion would rank 
qi1 as dominant over qi, and the latter distribution as 
dominant over q*2 .
One important class of intergenerational mobility 
measures is that defined by Atkinson (1981) . Atkinson has 
investigated the class of mobility measures defined over the 
joint realisations of the parents and children's incomes. 
Writing the underlying social welfare function as
W = J J v ( x ,  y)  f  ( x , y )  dx dy ( 3 . 1 )
one is then able to characterize how changes in the joint 
distribution of parents and children incomes, f(x,y), 
influences the overall level of welfare. In order to focus 
entirely on re-ranking, or exchange mobility, here we 
confine our discussion to intergenerational mobility 
processes where the marginal distributions f(x) and f(y) are 
identical. Assume initially that v(x,y) is additive:
v(x,y) = ui(x) + U2 (y) (3.2)
the social welfare function W can be then be expressed as :
W = J J { ui(x) + U2 (y)} f(x,y)dx dy
or alternatively as,
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W = J ui(x)f(x)dx + j U2 (y)f(y)dy (3.3)
When v(x,y) is additive, the overall level of welfare is 
solely determined by the marginal distributions f(x) and 
f (y) ; rather than by the extent to which x and y correlate. 
Atkinson (1981) writes:
"From some standpoints the adoption of an additive function may appear 
quite acceptable. It may be argued, for example, that we should only 
be concerned with the distribution at each date and not worry about 
the movement between income ranges."
Under the additivity assumption, the social valuation of a 
second generation individual's income y, is independent of 
his parents income, x. Atkinson then considers the class of 
social welfare functions for which an increase in 
intergenerational mobility raises social welfare. This 
class, v-, is the class of v(x,y) functions such that the 
cross derivative 32v/8x8y < 0. For v e v-,an increase in y 
lowers the social value of a unit increase in x. Thus, the 
more correlated are x and y, the lower social welfare 
becomes. The social welfare function is therefore said to 
exhibit preference for mobility when the cross-derivative 
of v(x,y) is negative*5* .
An intergenerational mobility measure which belongs to 
the Atkinson v- class, is that proposed by Dardanoni (1991):
D=J O ( x )  [ J u ( y ) f ( y | x ) d y  ] f ( x )  dx ( 3 . 4 )
where O(x) is any decreasing function of x, so as to capture 
the view that a marginal welfare gain for children of the 
less well-off has a greater social value than a 
corresponding welfare gain for the children of the rich.
Schokkaert and Van de gaer have discussed the 
similarity between the approach of Dardanoni and the
*5) Atkinson makes further refinements of the approach, and introduces another 
class, v— , of mobility measures.
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Atkinson v- class of mobility measures. In Lemma 21 of their 
paper they show that the measure D, defined in (3.4), is a 
member of the Atkinson v- class of measures. They criticize 
the "Atkinson/Dardanoniu approach on the basis that:
"This amounts to an unequal treatment of children of different 
descent, in which the children of poor parents are rewarded and 
children of rich parents are punished."
Schokkaert and Van de gaer follow an "opportunities" 
approach and offer "ex-ante fairness of intergenerational 
transmission processes" as an alternative to the Atkinson 
approach.
Last but not least, the regression coefficient, which 
we denote by (3,is perhaps the most popular tool used for the 
measurement of intergenerational mobility. Since it is 
generally taken that a high correlation between the incomes 
of parents and children is associated with a low degree of 
justice, we can take minus the regression coefficient to be 
the appropriate index of intergenerational mobility. From 
the recent studies of Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992) it 
would appear that the regression coefficient is of the order 
of 0.3 to 0.5. One special case where the regression 
coefficient relates to our justice criterion in a 
straightforward manner, is when the income distributions of 
the various socio-economic groups are all equal. Under this 
specific scenario, f(y|Xi)=f(y|Xj)=f*. The child's economic 
status is then independently distributed from that of his 
parents, and therefore (3=0.
To pave the way for our empirical applications, we 
review in the next section some concepts pertaining to the 
distribution-free statistical inference about Lorenz curves 
and empirical distribution functions.
4.4 Implementation
In seeking conclusions about the justice of an 
intergenerational mobility process, we will attempt to be as 
general as possible. Because we are using samples, we need
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to test the assumption that, say, welfare is higher in 
socio-economic group A than in group B. Often this may 
require making assumptions about the population from which 
we are sampling. But then our conclusions may be invalidated 
if we assume that the distribution of income is say, log­
normal, whereas it happens to be a Pareto distribution. To 
remove such limitations, we will follow a distribution-free 
approach for inferential purposes.
Let us assume that our income variable y has a 
positive mean 11, and a finite variance Gyy, and that its 
cumulative distribution function F(.) is continuous and 
strictly increasing. A natural way of ranking income 
distributions can be performed on the basis of order 
statistics. The distribution theory for order statistics is 
well known so that tests of hypotheses can be systematically 
derived along the lines of classical statistical inference. 
The following result shows why this approach will not yield 
distribution-free conclusions. Let ep denote the 
corresponding sample statistic for ep. Also define £*' = (£!, 
£2 , . . . <£k-i) (and e* ' = (ei, e2 » . . . # ek-i) • Then n1/2(e*-£*) is 
asymptotically distributed with zero mean and covariance 
matrix A :
A =
Pi(l-Pi)/fi ••• Pi(l-Pk-i)/fifk-i
Pi (l~Pk-l) /f lfk-1 ••• Pk-l( l~Pk-l) / f k-1
where £1 < £2 <...<£k-i and fp denotes f(£p) (see Beach and 
Davidson (1983)). Because the covariance matrix A is 
dependent upon f(.), it is impossible to specify it without 
giving a parametric form for f(.). Therefore, inferences 
based on order statistics will not be distribution-free.
On the other hand, we can exploit the fact that the 
sample mean of any distribution will converge to a normal 
distribution with the same population mean, and a factor 
(1/n) times the variance of the population.
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Looking back to the definition of the Generalized 
Lorenz curve in (2.3), we can rewrite GLC(p) as follows:
fGLC(p) = F (£p) \ ^ U £(U) du^  1 F (£p) (4.1)
so that GLC(p) is in fact a multiple of the mean of the 
conditional distribution of y, upon it being smaller than 
£p. Noting from (2.1) that F(£p)=p, we can express (4.1) as:
GLC(p) = p y (4.2)
where y=E(y/y<zp) . Define 0 as the vector of Generalized 
Lorenz curve ordinates: 0 = (p!Yl/ P2Y2 /•••#pkYk)* Let 0 and
A
y denote the corresponding sample statistics to 0  and y.
A*
Since 0 contains no more than sample means, we can hope that 
its asymptotic distribution may be derived independently of 
the distribution of y. Beach and Davidson (1983) show indeed 
that the asymptotic distribution of 0  is independent of f:
A
Vn ( 0  - © )  — » N  (0, Z)
where for i<j :
Oij = Pi [ + (1-pi )(Ei -Yi ) (£j-Yj ) + (£i_Yi ) (Yj-Yi) ] (4.3)
and hi2 = var(y/y<£p). Consider now the case where we have 
an independent random sample for each of two socio-economic 
groups of respective sizes nx and n2, and Generalized Lorenz
curve ordinates 0i and © 2 - Then any test of comparison of 
the two Generalized Lorenz curves can be based on the 
vector
d= ©i - 0 2 (4.4)
and the covariance matrix
Likewise, define O  = ( Oi,...,O k) as the vector of population 
Lorenz curve ordinates, and let O* be the k-1 vector 
. . . ,<&k-i) • Beach and Davidson also show that O* (the
sample counter-part of <!>*) is asymptotically normal in the 
sense that:
ni/2 [ <d* . $* ] -> N ( 0 , V )
where for i<j=l,...,k-l
.. _ . /PiYi\ (PiYi\ IPM]
where 11 and ayy are respectively the population mean and 
variance of y.
Finally, let Fn and Gn denote two empirical distribution 
functions constructed on the basis of two independent 
samples of size n, drawn from unknown populations F and G. 
Define the following two vertical distances
Tfg = n1/2 suPy [Fn(y) - Gn(y) ]
and (4.7)
Tgf = n1/2 suPy [Gn (y) - Fn(y) ]
T fg and Tgf are distributed as Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K.S) 
statistics (see Mood et al. (1974) pp. 508-510), and can be 
used to test first order stochastic dominance (FOSD) 
hypotheses (Whitmore (1978, McFadden (1989)). Let Ki_a denote 
the (100-a)% quantile of the K.S. distribution. Then 
consider the following two cases:
(Cl): Tfg < Ki-cc < Tgf (4.8a)
(Cl): Tgf < Ki_a < TFG (4.8b)
If Cl arises, we may conclude that F dominates G in the FOSD 
sense, at a a% probability of type I error. Conversely if C2 
occurs, we conclude that G dominates F. If neither of Cl or
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C2 occurs, we conclude that none of the two distributions is 
dominant at the specified significance level.
4.5 Data Limitations
The observations we will be using in order to 
illustrate our justice criterion were extracted from wave 
XX of the University of Michigan's Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics. The fathers and sons sample was described in 
section 0 . 2 of our introductory chapter, and its adequacy 
for the study of intergenerational mobility was discussed in 
section 0.3 of the same chapter. There we mentioned that the 
data we ideally required were lifetime profiles on incomes. 
Instead, as Jenkins (1987) puts it, we possess "snapshot" 
observations as opposed to complete "movies" on incomes.
Given these data limitations, we have to select the 
most appropriate indicator variables of economic status. 
The variables we opt for are the average hourly earnings 
of fathers and their sons. Other possible indicators include 
occupational status, family income, and annual earnings. We 
discuss the strengths and weaknesses of these alternative 
indicators in turn.
Occupational status does appear to be attractive at 
first sight since it would appear that it is not subject to 
measurement error in the way that income and earnings are. 
There are several disadvantages in using occupational status 
though. The distribution of workers by occupation is largely 
influenced by the state of technology. A high level of 
intergenerational occupational mobility can be recorded 
because there are hardly any milkmen left, because the 
automobile industry is highly automatised today, and because 
there were hardly any computer engineers and information 
systems experts, twenty years ago. There is also the fact 
that some children may inherit the occupation of the 
parents, but may become incompetent in an area where their 
parents excelled. A high degree of earnings mobility is 
compatible with little occupational mobility. There is also 
the other case, where the son of a mediocre plumber becomes 
an equally incompetent professional.
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A high degree of occupational mobility may therefore 
conceal a high degree of inheritance in economic status. 
There is also a highly subjective element residing in the 
classification of jobs into various occupations, and in the 
ordinal ranking of occupations. This subjective element is 
much less present in the definition of earnings classes due 
to the quantitative nature of the underlying variable.
As an alternative to occupational status, we may want 
to use income. Its quantitative nature makes it a more 
objective indicator than occupational status. Income is 
derived from many sources, and may contain non-monetary 
components such as free housing, food stamps, and other 
benefits in kind. Earnings, on the other hand, are derived 
from a unique source, namely the sale of one's labour 
services. Differences in income may also be due to differing 
attitudes towards relying on assistance from others 
(typically relatives, and the state) thus resulting in 
heterogeneous discounting of the various sources of income. 
Income is also due to serious measurement error at both 
tails of the distribution. Wealth income is also largely 
undeclared.
Annual earnings provide us with another candidate 
indicator of economic status. We already stated one of their 
potential advantage over income, namely the unique source 
from which they are derived. An exception of course is when 
people derive earnings from several sources, such as a 
permanent job coupled with occasional independent 
activities. The limitation of annual earnings resides in the 
the fact that differences in the variable are the result of 
two separate components, annual work hours and hourly pay. 
We could expect the distribution of annual earnings to be 
more equally distributed than hourly wages, since on the one 
hand consumption is a normal good at low incomes, and that 
leisure is (usually) normal, while consumption may not be at 
high levels of income. In this sense, the use of hourly 
rather than annual earnings may be seen as a sensible 
choice.
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Hourly earnings are limited by their low accuracy. 
In the PSID they are constructed as the ratio of annual 
earnings to work hours. They are thus likely to be subject 
to two sources of measurement error, annual wages in the 
numerator, and annual work hours in the denominator. From 
the PSID cross-validation study of Bound et al. (1989), we 
know that both sources of measurement error are present in 
the construction of hourly earnings. The resulting effect is 
that the correlation (in logs) between reported values and 
company records, is as low as 0.56 for hourly earnings, 
while it takes a value of 0.81 for annual earnings. In 
theory, nonetheless, differences in hourly wages are due 
to differences in productivity so that there is a clear 
economic meaning to be attached to this variable 
(discrimination on the basis of sex, race and social 
background are obvious departures from the "theory"). On 
such grounds, hourly earnings may appear to be the most 
suitable (though far from ideal) choice for an indicator of 
economic status.
4,6 Application to the Fathers and Sons Sample
In our empirical application we compare the earnings 
distribution of those individuals whose fathers belonged to 
the lower 50% earnings quantile, with the distribution for 
those who had fathers in the upper earnings quantile. 
Earnings of fathers were reported for 1967, while those of 
sons pertained to 1986. We refer to this analysis as that 
of "top versus bottom". Our analysis would then be 
informative of the pattern of intergenerational mobility if 
reported hourly earnings of parents preserved the same 
ranking (between lower and upper quantiles) as their life­
cycles incomes, and likewise if children's wages preserved 
an identical ranking as their own life-cycle incomes. These 
are of course strong assumptions. It is therefore necessary 
to treat the analysis that follows as being indicative as 
opposed to confirmative. On such basis, one should also be 
cautious in drawing any definite conclusions about 
intergenerational justice in the United States.
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Figure 4.2 depicts the Generalized Lorenz curves for 
the two groups of second generation individuals. The GLC 
curves are plotted at 10 different points. On the horizontal 
axis, the pth point pertains to the bottom p/ 1 0 fraction of 
the population. In other words, it is defined as the pth 
decile. The GLC curve for sons from the top earnings class 
lies everywhere above that of sons from the bottom earnings 
class.
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FIGURE 4.2 top 50% versus bottom 50%, Generalized Lorenz curves 
and 95% confidence intervals
At first sight it therefore appears that the former 
distribution dominates the latter, so that the studied 
mobility process exhibits injustice. In order to validate 
the injustice hypothesis, we need to test the assumption 
that the GLC curve for the sons from the privileged 
earnings background lies at every point above that of the 
other group. The statistic Zp defined below,
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z P =  d p  /  C0p p
is asymptotically distributed as a N(0,1) variable under the 
assumption that the two Generalized Lorenz curves are equal. 
C0pp is the pth diagonal element of Cl, and dp is the 
difference between the two Generalized Lorenz curves at the 
pth decile. Table 4.1 below reports the values for the 
Generalized Lorenz curves ordinates, standard errors in 
brackets, and the corresponding Zp statistics.
p glc2 (p) GLCi(p) z p
1 0 .341 ( 0 . 0 2 6 ) 0.222 ( 0 . 0 1 7 ) 3.786
2 0 . 926 ( 0 . 0 4 7 ) 0.608 ( 0 . 0 3 2 ) 5.540
3 1 . 661 ( 0 . 0 6 7 ) 1 . 094 ( 0 . 0 4 9 ) 6.831
4 2 .544 ( 0 . 0 9 4 ) 1. 689 ( 0 . 0 6 5 ) 7.484
5 3.564 ( 0 . 120) 2 .404 ( 0 . 0 8 7 ) 7.864
6 4 .773 ( 0 . 1 6 0 ) 3 .230 ( 0 . 1 0 7 ) 8.027
7 6  . 186 ( 0 . 1 8 3 ) 4 .208 ( 0 . 1 3 5 ) 8.699
8 7.760 (0.212) 5.348 ( 0 . 1 6 0 ) 9.076
9 9.669 ( 0 . 2 5 3 ) 6.746 (0.194) 9.171
10 12.713 (O.218) 8. 884 ( 0 . 2 8 5 ) 7.834
TABLE 4.1: top 50% versus bottom 50%, Generalized Lorenz curve
ordinates
GLC2 is the Generalized Lorenz curve for the sons from the 
top earnings class, while GLCi is the corresponding curve 
for the sons originating from the bottom earnings 
background. As is seen from the last column, the differences 
between the GLC curve ordinates are all significant at a 
99% significance level. Using the evidence from the 
individual statistics Zp, we conclude that the earnings 
distribution for the children originating from the bottom 
earnings class is dominated by that of the children from the
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top earnings background. We conclude therefore that the 
mobility process exhibits injustice.
The fathers and sons sample therefore provide 
sufficient evidence in order to confirm the injustice 
hypothesis. In explaining the finding that the distribution 
for children whose fathers were in the top 50% group in 1967 
welfare dominates the distribution of the disadvantaged 
group, we have to address the following questions:
(i) What is the likely effect of considering 
alternative definitions of family background? Is the above 
conclusion maintained if we say compare the children 
originating from the top 20% income group with those whose 
parents were in the lower earnings quintile in 1967?
(ii) How do the distributions differ in terms of 
earnings inequality? Are the differences most striking at 
the tales or in the middle income groups?
(iii) What is the pattern of stochastic dominance of 
f(y|x2) over f(y|Xi) ? Is it one of second order stochastic 
dominance only, or is there a pattern of first order 
stochastic dominance too?
(iv) How do the results relate to the pattern of 
intergenerational mobility of f(x,y)?
We take up these points in turn.
(i) Alternative definitions of family background 
What would the Generalized Lorenz curves look like if we 
were to compare the children originating from the bottom 20% 
earnings group with those from the top 20% group? Let us 
refer to these two groups as L20 and U20 respectively. On 
the one hand the heterogeneity between these two sub-samples 
is greater in terms of family background, so that to the 
extent that economic success is influenced by family 
background, we would expect the previously reached 
conclusions to be confirmed. On the other hand, since we are 
working with only 40% of the data, sample variances may be 
too high to enable us to reject the justice assumption.
As can be seen from table 4.2, GLCu20/ the Generalized 
Lorenz curve of the children from the top 20% earnings
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background, dominates the corresponding curve for the 
children originating from the bottom 20% earnings class.
p GLCu2 0 (p) GLCl20(P) ZP
1 0.428 (0.040) 0.174 (0.021) 5.558
2 1.101 (0.074) 0.491 (0.051) 6.787
3 1.962 (0.138) 0.932 (0.075) 6.552
4 3.036 (0.193) 1.474 (0.100) 7 .194
5 4.373 (0.259) 2.108 (0.129) 7.828
6 5.882 (0.293) 2.848 (0.153) 9.179
7 7.503 (0.329) 3.678 (0.179) 10.203
8 9.337 (0.383) 4.708 (0.228) 10.388
9 11.490 (0.433) 6.040 (0.304) 10.303
10 14.502 (0.561) 8.462 (0.559) 7.629
TABLE 4.2: top 20% versus bottom 20%, Generalized Lorenz curve
ordinates
Once again, the data allow us to confirm the injustice 
assumption at a 99% significance level. In an earlier draft 
of the chapter we compared the two sub-samples of whites 
and non-whites. There we also found similar evidence that 
white children fared much better than their non-whites 
counter-parts(6) .
(ii) Testing for inequality differences
A distribution F may be less equally distributed than 
another one G, but provided F has a sufficiently higher mean 
income the resulting pattern may be one of welfare dominance 
of F over G. As can be read from the last line of table 4.1, 
the mean value of hourly wages was $12.7 per hour in the 
privileged group and $8.9 per hour in the disadvantaged
This result is in line with the findings of Bound and Freeman (1992). 
Borjas (1992) explains the relationship between economic success and cultural 
background using an ethnic capital theory.
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group. The Zp statistic of 7.83 indicates that the 
difference in average wages is statistically significant 
from zero. It is therefore interesting to inquire as to 
which of the two earnings distributions is more equally 
distributed.
p lc2(p) LCi(p) Z P
1 0.026 (0.002) 0 . 025 (0.002) 0.655
2 0 .072 (0.004) 0 . 068 (0.003) 0.863
3 0 . 130 (0.005) 0 . 123 (0.005) 1.046
4 0.200 (0.007) 0 . 189 (0.006) 1.170
5 0.280 (0.008) 0.271 (0.008) 0.820
6 0.374 (o.oio) 0.363 (o.oio) 0.810
7 0.486 (o.oii) 0.473 (o.oii) 0.850
8 0.610 (o.oi3) 0.601 (0.012) 0.469
9 0 .759 (0.014) 0.758 (o.oi3) 0.078
10 1 1 —
TABLE 4.3: top 50% versus bottom 50%, Lorenz curve ordinates
Though it appears that the distribution of earnings for the 
top 50% group is more equally distributed (LC2 (p) ^ LCi(p) 
for all p) , none of the differences in Lorenz curve 
ordinates are statistically significant. This result points 
to the conclusion that earnings inequality does not appear 
to vary across the two socio-economic groups.
(iii) The pattern of stochastic dominance
Given that the two earnings distributions appear to be 
equally distributed, but that F2 (the distribution of the 
children originating from the top 50% group) has a higher 
sample mean than Fi (the corresponding distribution for the 
the bottom 50% group) , we are lead to believe that the 
violation of justice takes the form of a first order
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stochastic dominance of F2 over Fi. Let us look at the 
transition matrix underlying the process:
n = 0.140 0.142 0.123 0.102 0.114 0.093 0.108 0.053 0.081 0.045 
0.059 0.059 0.076 0.099 0.085 0.108 0.090 0.148 0.118 0.156
By cumulating the elements along the rows one notes that the 
sum is always smaller along the bottom line. Our initial 
guess would indeed be that F2 dominates Fi.
Let Fin denote the sample analogue of Fi. A general test 
of first order stochastic dominance can be based on the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic. From our sample
while
S U P y  [Fin ( y )  - F2n(y) ] = 0.2465,
suPy [F2n (y) - Fin(y) ] = 0
For n=472, we therefore have that
n1/2 suPy [Fln(y) - F2n(y) ] = 5.355
The critical value of the K.S. test at a=5% is equal to 
1.36. It follows that the largest vertical distance between 
the two empirical distributions is significant. On the basis 
of equations (4.8) we may conclude that the earnings 
distribution F2 for the privileged children first order 
dominates Fi. The implication of this result is that the 
confirmation of the injustice hypothesis would still be 
maintained even if we were to drop the assumption that the 
welfare functions exhibit social aversion to inequality.
(iv) Explanations based on the pattern of intergenerational 
mobility
In order to relate the welfare dominance results 
previously reached to the pattern of intergenerational 
mobility, we take a close look at the square (c x c) 
transition matrix of earnings. The construction of a square 
size transition matrix is particularly useful in the context 
of addressing question (iv) above, since it provides a
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natural set-up for examining the frequency of immobility 
(the diagonal JTn elements) , as well as the nature of 
mobility (viz. the off-diagonal TCij elements)
If we divide the sample of fathers and sons into a 5x5 
quintile classification (so as to obtain a square matrix 
with constant row and column marginals), we obtain the 
following matrix of counts:
63 50 31 24 21
58 40 41 27 23
27 32 55 42 33
26 40 37 56 30
15 27 25 40 82
The joint probability matrix of incomes, i.e. the discrete 
analogue of f(x,y), can be constructed by dividing each 
element by the total number of observations (n=945). 
Likewise, 71^  =5 .pij = (5/945) tjj{7) •
0.3333 0.2646 0.1640 0.1270 0.1111
0.3069 0.2116 0.2169 0.1429 0.1217
n  = 0.1429 0.1693 0.2910 0.2222 0.1746
0.1376 0.2116 0.1958 0.2963 0.1587
. 0.0794 0.1429 0.1323 0.2116 0.4339
The matrices T and n reveal two interesting patterns. 
Firstly, there appears to be a high degree of inheritance of 
income status: with the exception of the second row, in each 
line the diagonal element has the largest fraction of 
families. This phenomenon is especially marked at the bottom 
and top lines of the transition matrix. Also, the data tend 
to reveal a pattern of symmetry. Under the symmetry 
assumption, the probability of observing upward moves from 
class i to j, pij, equals the probability pji of observing a 
similar downward move. Given the classification of parents 
and children into c groups of equal size, 7tij=cpij , so that 
symmetry can be stated either in terms of the transition 
matrix n, or the joint distribution matrix P.
A test of symmetry based on the matrix of counts T 
is described in Everitt (1977) p.155. The statistic X2:
More precisely, the transition matrix can be estimated using the Maximum 
Likelihood method by dividing each entry in a given line by the sum of the 
line elements (see Anderson and Goodman (1957)).
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X2- ^i<j { (ti j t j i) 2 / (ti j + t j i) J
is asymptotically distributed as a Chi-Square variable with 
v=c(c-l)/2 degrees of freedom, where c is the number of 
classes. Here c=5, so that we have v=10 degrees of freedom. 
From the matrix T above, we calculate X2=8.749. The critical 
value of our test at a 5 % probability of type-I error, is 
18.307. The hypothesis of symmetry thus cannot be rejected. 
In order to be assured that this result is not purely due to 
the choice of five classes, we report similar results in the 
table below for other values of c.
c X2 %2v;0.95
3 1.516 7.815
4 0.559 12.60
5 8.749 18.307
6 12.149 25.0
7 21.311 32.7
8 31.21 41.337
TABLE 4.4: Testing symmetry
We conclude from the calculations reported in table 4.5, 
that the assumption of symmetry is not rejected (for most 
values of c), at a 5% probability of type-I error.
The symmetry model therefore provides us with an 
adequate parametrization of our intergenerational data. It 
also helps us to understand why these data conform to the 
injustice scenario: the son of a low income father has a 
small chance of climbing up to the top earnings group, and 
likewise the son of a rich man is equally unlikely to 
experience a similar downward fall. For instance, under the 
symmetry model, 7Ci5 =7C5i , estimated at (21 + 15)/(2 x 189) =
0.096.
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It should be noted that it is not the property of 
symmetry on its own which causes the confirmation of the 
injustice scenario. To take a limiting case, if 7Cij=l/c for 
all i and j, the intergenerational mobility process is 
symmetric, and justice obtains (as a result of equality of 
distributions). What explains the welfare dominance 
pattern in favour of the privileged children, is the fact 
that the diagonal elements of n are fairly large in 
magnitude. For example, Ku is estimated at 1/3, and 7C55 at 
0.43. It therefore appears that it is the combined facts of 
symmetry coupled with lack of mobility which taken 
together, account for the confirmation of the injustice 
scenario.
4.6 Conclusions
We have suggested that the justice assessment of 
intergenerational mobility processes be carried out via the 
comparison of income distributions of the second generation 
families originating from various socio-economic groups. The 
principle guiding our assessment was one of welfare 
dominance, meaning that justice is rejected when it can be 
concluded that one socio-economic group is unambiguously 
better off than any other one.
Bearing in mind that life-cycle biases, measurement 
errors, and lack of population representativeness, are all 
serious sources of data limitations, we conclude that the 
intergenerational data we have examined lead to the 
confirmation of the injustice scenario. This result is 
explained by noting the occurrence of an apparently 
symmetric pattern of movement between income classes, 
coupled with relatively high income inheritance 
probabilities. The resulting effect is such that the income 
distributions of children originating from privileged 
backgrounds dominate the distributions for children from 
less favourable economic backgrounds.
These conclusions were reached on the basis of the 
PSID. Other U.S. data sets ought to be examined before one 
makes strong assertions about the pattern of
intergenerational mobility in the United States. Also, such 
findings need not be valid for other countries. The study of 
Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) suggests that amongst 
developed economies some differences in the pattern of 
intergenerational mobility can be observed between on the 
one hand the group of European nations, and on the other 
hand, the U.S. Australia and Japan. Socialist economies may 
be expected to exhibit a different pattern from market 
economies. The stage of economic development may also be an 
important factor. The time horizon over which incomes are 
observed could also be an important element. Studies of 
occupational mobility suggest that individuals experience 
some downward mobility in their first years of work, but 
eventually converge to their parents occupational group. 
Finally we note that our sample only looked at the mobility 
of men. Because the labour force participation of women is 
governed by different circumstances from that of men, there 
is no reason to expect the patterns of intergenerational 
mobility of men and women to be similar.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusions and Directions for Future Research
5.1 Summing Up
In the first two chapters of the thesis we have dealt 
with the questions of identifying the poor and allocating 
benefits to individuals in a situation of income 
uncertainty. We suggested to identify the poor using 
multiple indicators of living standards. From a p x 1 vector 
of indicators, a uni-dimensional sufficient statistic was 
constructed in order to rank families in the permanent 
income space. At a practical level, the multiple indicator 
index appeared to correlate highest with all three 
indicators considered in our empirical applications. This 
observation lead us to conclude that the suggested framework 
was a sensible compromise between ranking families according 
to food budget share exclusively, versus using an income 
definition in the identification of the poor.
Using the framework developed in chapter one, we have 
then addressed in chapter two the question of the allocation 
of state benefits in a situation of income uncertainty. We 
have adopted a decision-theoretic approach to the problem. 
The solution then consisted in granting assistance to a 
family if the expected social benefit from the transfer 
outweighed the corresponding social cost. Increases in the 
size of the transfer and in the social opportunity cost of 
poverty alleviation policies reduced the likelihood that a 
given family qualifies for state assistance, while rises in 
the poverty line made it more likely.
The purpose of our empirical section was to illustrate 
how changes in the parameters of the problem altered the 
degree of coverage of a hypothetical poverty alleviation
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programme. As we moved from restricted coverage towards a 
universal benefit system, the pool of recipients revealed on 
average better incomes and employment possibilities, and 
lower food budget shares. In this sense, the decision 
theoretic framework adopted in the allocation of benefits 
under uncertainty seemed to do the job adequately.
In chapter 3 we examined the relationship between 
credit market imperfections and the incidence of poverty. 
Our main finding was that credit market imperfections did 
not increase the incidence of poverty, and furthermore could 
allow poverty reductions. This result was obtained in a 
setting of adverse selection. The conclusions depend to a 
certain extent on the assumptions underlying the functioning 
of the credit market. Nonetheless the findings are useful in 
illustrating two points.
Firstly we note that the distinction between first and 
second best economies becomes misleading when we consider 
other objectives than the maximisation of social surplus. 
When poverty reduction is taken as the social objective, the 
economy operating under a regime of imperfect information (a 
typical second best case) may out-perform the first best 
economy in terms of achieving a lower incidence of
poverty. The second point the model serves to illustrate, is
the importance of assessing the likely impacts of efficiency 
enhancing policies on the incidence of poverty. As was
pointed out in a different context by Atkinson (1993b), it 
may well be that government regulatory policy in an
imperfect market has an adverse effect on the level of 
poverty.
The purpose of chapter 4 was to suggest a criterion for 
the justice assessment of intergenerational mobility 
processes. Our interest in the question was motivated by the 
empirical evidence as well as the theoretical models that 
establish the importance of family background in the 
determination of income. We were thus lead to qualify an 
intergenerational mobility process as being unjust if it 
were possible to obtain a welfare ranking of income 
distributions for any two groups of individuals (using a
135
classification based on socio-economic background). The 
evidence from our fathers and sons sample pointed towards 
the injustice scenario.
This conclusion however cannot be taken at face value. 
Given the many data shortcomings involved with studies of 
this nature, one can only treat the results as suggestive of 
a particular scenario. Further research is required in order 
to take into account sample selection and attrition biases, 
as well as the measurement error problem. We take up these 
points in the section below, where we discuss directions 
for further research on the basis of what has been reached 
in the dissertation.
5.2 An Agenda for Future Work
In our first chapter we have brought together 
Friedman's theory of the consumption function and the method 
of factor analysis, in order to address the question of the 
identification of the poor. As discussed in Deaton (1992), 
empirical tests of the permanent income hypothesis often 
lead to its rejection. It may therefore be interesting to 
consider the question of the identification of the poor on 
the basis of other theories of consumption. We have also 
mentioned in chapter one that as an alternative to factor 
analysis one could use other multivariate data reduction 
methods such as principal component analysis.
Within factor-analytic methods, one could also consider 
more sophisticated models and estimation methods. Our model 
of chapter one was just-identified, but there may be reasons 
for fitting over-identified models, in which case estimation 
methods such as ordinary least squares, generalized least 
squares, or maximum likelihood, may provide different 
estimates. In the case of just-identified models, all three 
estimation methods are equivalent, so that in chapter one we 
did not have to worry about the choice of estimation 
technique. The choice of indicators is also an important 
question. Theoretical considerations may guide our initial 
choices, but data limitations may lead us to search for 
other variables. There may be theoretical grounds for
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selecting a set of indicators X* over X, however the fitted
covariance matrix for the error vector may fail to be
positive definite using X* (1), but not using X.
We have mentioned in chapter two the many factors we 
have omitted in our analysis of the allocation of benefits 
under uncertainty. These included the disincentive effects 
of state transfers, the take-up problem, as well as transfer 
costs. The framework could be further developed in order to 
make the size of the transfer a choice variable, as in
Glewwe (1990).
Given the current policy debates about the choice 
between means-testing, versus universal provision of 
benefits, we feel that the model could be formulated in
different terms in order to make it appear more relevant to
policy analysis. The relationship between income and the 
poverty line may for instance be modelled as a productivity 
relationship, as opposed to solely being based on welfare 
considerations. Type-I errors would then be seen as 
resulting in productivity losses, not just depriving the 
poor from enjoying higher welfare levels. We are too often 
reminded of the disincentive effects of transfers. However, 
we feel that the incentive effects of transfers may be far 
more important for the poorer groups of society, especially 
within the context of developing countries. Nutritional 
models (for e.g. Dasgupta and Ray (1986)), efficiency wage 
arguments (Weiss (1991)), and also our model of chapter 3, 
point towards the argument that state transfers may result 
in efficiency gains.
As illustrated in our empirical applications, increases 
in the poverty line entail a higher degree of benefit 
coverage. One could then use these results to illustrate 
that say, even if the poverty line is set at the 10% 
quantile, the next 15% from the population may also derive 
utility from public transfers. This would be one way of 
modelling the effect of poverty alleviation policies on the 
near-poor. Similar extensions of the present framework
(1) In the factor analysis literature, such situations are referred to as 
Heywood cases.
137
could make it appear more in line with the current policy 
debate about targeting versus universal provision of 
benefits.
One weakness of the model of chapter 3 can be seen by 
contrasting its predictions about the pattern of 
intergenerational earnings mobility, with the empirical 
findings of chapter 4. The model does not have any downward 
mobility, whereas the intergenerational transition matrix of 
earnings exhibits a symmetry pattern. How do we reconcile 
these two facts?
One attitude would consist of rejecting the findings, 
since sample selection biases and measurement errors in 
earnings are too serious for us to have any faith in our 
results. We return to this point below. Another way of 
reconciling data and theory, would be to calibre the 
predictions of the model of chapter 3 towards the symmetry 
pattern. In a previous version of the model, both funded and 
non-funded agents came as high and low return to education 
individuals. The economy thus consisted of four types of 
workers: NH, NL, FH, and FL. Under the assumption that the 
distributions of ability and wealth were independent, it 
was shown that both low return types (NL and FL) had 
identical reservation wages despite the differences in their 
wealth backgrounds. Then we can show that when the demand 
for skilled labour is not high enough to induce the 
participation of the low returns individuals, but 
sufficiently high for NH-type individuals to wish to acquire 
education, some downward mobility may be observed. By this 
we mean that FL individuals may end up earning lower wages 
than NH individuals. Though such a model would entail some 
downward mobility, it does not follow that the resulting 
overall pattern of movement between classes may be 
symmetric. Piketty's (1992) model also entails some downward 
mobility, but symmetry does not follow from the predictions 
of his model either.
Our feeling is that there is more to the symmetry 
result than just noisy data. We would thus be inclined to 
conclude that it is a question worth pursuing at the theory
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level, and that explanations may have to be sought through 
other mechanisms than the relationship between the 
allocation of credit and the the distribution of income. 
Wealth and ability backgrounds are of course important 
determinants of income, but as discussed by Bowles(1973), 
there may be other equally important cultural and social 
factors that influence the overall pattern of 
intergenerational mobility.
Data limitations are the major problem of empirical 
studies on intergenerational mobility. For this reason, 
little can be concluded about the findings of chapter 4. 
More work is required in modelling the probability processes 
underlying intergenerational samples. Methods of correcting 
for sample selection biases are well developed in 
econometrics (for e.g. Amemiya (1985) ch. 10) . As pointed 
out by Hsiao (1986) and Atkinson et al.(1992), these same 
methods can be used to correct for attrition biases in 
longitudinal data sets.
Errors in variables methods are widely used in 
regression analysis. Typical applications in empirical 
labour economics consist of modelling the determinants of 
earnings. While the "purging" of data from various sources 
of "contamination" initially appeared an attractive 
solution, it is now apparent from cross-validation studies 
on incomes that the underlying assumptions in the errors in 
variables methods were wrong(2) . Great care is therefore 
needed in order to avoid further distorting reality with 
good intentions.
Nonetheless, the fact remains that hourly earnings are 
imperfect indicators of long-run economic status, just like 
current income is a noisy indicator of permanent income. The 
techniques of chapter 1 may therefore be used in order to 
rank fathers and sons according to long-run income status. 
Whether these predicted long term incomes are biased will 
not be crucial if we decide to work with transition 
matrices. Then what would matter would be the ranks of
(2) See Heckman (1993) for a critical survey on empirical labour economics.
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individuals, as opposed to the distances between their 
incomes.
Alternatively we may choose to work with transition 
matrices directly taking into account measurement errors(3) :
sample transition = population transition 4* error 
probability probability
Parametric models also need to be elaborated in order to 
further acquire understanding about the properties of 
intergenerational mobility processes. Abul Naga and Antille 
(work in progress) propose the model
n = A S + (I-A) + E
in the analysis of square intergenerational transition 
matrices. A is a diagonal matrix of unknown parameters in 
the interval 0 < a^ £ 1, S is an unknown symmetric
transition matrix, and E is a matrix of errors. More general 
models are also required in order to nest specific scenarios 
of interest in the field of intergenerational mobility. Such 
developments would further deepen our understanding of an 
important question in the social sciences.
(3) see chapter 11 of Amemiya (1985) for a discussion.
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